# Framework

### Framework 1NC

#### 1. Interpretation—the affirmative should defend a federal government policy that increases economic engagement to one of the topic countries

#### A. Colon means USFG is the Agent

Army Officer School 2004 (5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)

The colon introduces the following: a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g.  A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:"Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

#### B. “United States Federal Government should” means the debate is solely about the outcome of a policy established by governmental means

Ericson 2003 (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### 2. Vote Neg

#### A) Limits – Specific, limited resolutions ensure mutual ground which is key to sustainable controversy without sacrificing creativity or openness

Steinberg & Freeley 2008

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Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the **broad topic** of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. **Vague understanding** results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.¶ Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education **without** finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.¶ To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.¶ Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by **focus on a particular point of difference**, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Education – Scenario simulation lets students test decisions and strategies without the real stakes of having to implement them—this process is more transformative than the content of the 1ac

Hanghoj 2008

[Thorkild, PhD, assistant professor, School of Education, University of Aarhus, also affiliated with the Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials, located at the Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf]

Joas’ re-interpretation of Dewey’s pragmatism as a “theory of situated creativity” raises a critique of humans as purely rational agents that navigate instrumentally through meansends- schemes (Joas, 1996: 133f). This critique is particularly important when trying to understand how games are enacted and validated within the realm of educational institutions that by definition are inscribed in the great modernistic narrative of “progress” where nation states, teachers and parents expect students to acquire specific skills and competencies (Popkewitz, 1998; cf. chapter 3). However, as Dewey argues, the actual doings of educational gaming cannot be reduced to rational means-ends schemes. Instead, the situated interaction between teachers, students, and learning resources are played out as contingent re-distributions of means, ends and ends in view, which often make classroom contexts seem “messy” from an outsider’s perspective (Barab & Squire, 2004). 4.2.3. Dramatic rehearsal The two preceding sections discussed how Dewey views play as an imaginative activity of educational value, and how his assumptions on creativity and playful actions represent a critique of rational means-end schemes. For now, I will turn to Dewey’s concept of dramatic rehearsal, which assumes that social actors deliberate by projecting and choosing between various scenarios for future action. Dewey uses the concept dramatic rehearsal several times in his work but presents the most extensive elaboration in Human Nature and Conduct: Deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing possible lines of action… [It] is an experiment in finding out what the various lines of possible action are really like (...) Thought runs ahead and foresees outcomes, and thereby avoids having to await the instruction of actual failure and disaster. An act overtly tried out is irrevocable, its consequences cannot be blotted out. An act tried out in imagination is not final or fatal. It is retrievable (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This excerpt illustrates how Dewey views the process of decision making (deliberation) through the lens of an imaginative drama metaphor. Thus, decisions are made through the imaginative projection of outcomes, where the “possible competing lines of action” are resolved through a thought experiment. Moreover, Dewey’s compelling use of the drama metaphor also implies that decisions cannot be reduced to utilitarian, rational or mechanical exercises, but that they have emotional, creative and personal qualities as well. Interestingly, there are relatively few discussions within the vast research literature on Dewey of his concept of dramatic rehearsal. A notable exception is the phenomenologist Alfred Schütz, who praises Dewey’s concept as a “fortunate image” for understanding everyday rationality (Schütz, 1943: 140). Other attempts are primarily related to overall discussions on moral or ethical deliberation (Caspary, 1991, 2000, 2006; Fesmire, 1995, 2003; Rönssön, 2003; McVea, 2006). As Fesmire points out, dramatic rehearsal is intended to describe an important phase of deliberation that does not characterise the whole process of making moral decisions, which includes “duties and contractual obligations, short and long-term consequences, traits of character to be affected, and rights” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Instead, dramatic rehearsal should be seen as the process of “crystallizing possibilities and transforming them into directive hypotheses” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Thus, deliberation can in no way guarantee that the response of a “thought experiment” will be successful. But what it can do is make the process of choosing more intelligent than would be the case with “blind” trial-and-error (Biesta, 2006: 8). The notion of dramatic rehearsal provides a valuable perspective for understanding educational gaming as a simultaneously real and imagined inquiry into domain-specific scenarios. Dewey defines dramatic rehearsal as the capacity to stage and evaluate “acts”, which implies an “irrevocable” difference between acts that are “tried out in imagination” and acts that are “overtly tried out” with real-life consequences (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This description shares obvious similarities with games as they require participants to inquire into and resolve scenario-specific problems (cf. chapter 2). On the other hand, there is also a striking difference between moral deliberation and educational game activities in terms of the actual consequences that follow particular actions. Thus, when it comes to educational games, acts are both imagined and tried out, but without all the real-life consequences of the practices, knowledge forms and outcomes that are being simulated in the game world. Simply put, there is a difference in realism between the dramatic rehearsals of everyday life and in games, which only “play at” or simulate the stakes and risks that characterise the “serious” nature of moral deliberation, i.e. a real-life politician trying to win a parliamentary election experiences more personal and emotional risk than students trying to win the election scenario of The Power Game. At the same time, the lack of real-life consequences in educational games makes it possible to design a relatively safe learning environment, where teachers can stage particular game scenarios to be enacted and validated for educational purposes. In this sense, educational games are able to provide a safe but meaningful way of letting teachers and students make mistakes (e.g. by giving a poor political presentation) and dramatically rehearse particular “competing possible lines of action” that are relevant to particular educational goals (Dewey, 1922: 132). Seen from this pragmatist perspective, the educational value of games is not so much a question of learning facts or giving the “right” answers, but more a question of exploring the contingent outcomes and domain-specific processes of problem-based scenarios.

#### These skills are key to policy transformation – internal link turns the aff

Mitchell 2010

[Gordon, associate professor and director of graduate studies in the Department of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 13.1, “SWITCH-SIDE DEBATING MEETS DEMAND-DRIVEN RHETORIC OF SCIENCE”]

The watchwords for the intelligence community’s debating initiative— collaboration, critical thinking, collective awareness—resonate with key terms anchoring the study of deliberative democracy. In a major new text, John Gastil defines deliberation as a process whereby people “carefully examine a problem and arrive at a well-reasoned solution aft er a period of inclusive, respectful consideration of diverse points of view.”40 Gastil and his colleagues in organizations such as the Kettering Foundation and the National Coalition for Dialogue and Deliberation are pursuing a research program that foregrounds the democratic telos of deliberative processes. Work in this area features a blend of concrete interventions and studies of citizen empowerment.41 Notably, a key theme in much of this literature concerns the relationship between deliberation and debate, with the latter term often loaded with pejorative baggage and working as a negative foil to highlight the positive qualities of deliberation.42 “Most political discussions, however, are debates. Stories in the media turn politics into a never-ending series of contests. People get swept into taking sides; their energy goes into figuring out who or what they’re for or against,” says Kettering president David Mathews and coauthor Noelle McAfee. “Deliberation is different. It is neither a partisan argument where opposing sides try to win nor a casual conversation conducted with polite civility. Public deliberation is a means by which citizens make tough choices about basic purposes and directions for their communities and their country. It is a way of reasoning and talking together.”43 Mathews and McAfee’s distrust of the debate process is almost paradigmatic amongst theorists and practitioners of Kettering-style deliberative democracy. One conceptual mechanism for reinforcing this debate-deliberation opposition is characterization of debate as a process inimical to deliberative aims, with debaters adopting dogmatic and fixed positions that frustrate the deliberative objective of “choice work.” In this register, Emily Robertson observes, “unlike deliberators, debaters are typically not open to the possibility of being shown wrong. . . . Debaters are not trying to find the best solution by keeping an open mind about the opponent’s point of view.”44 Similarly, founding documents from the University of Houston–Downtown’s Center for Public Deliberation state, “Public deliberation is about choice work, which is different from a dialogue or a debate. In dialogue, people oft en look to relate to each other, to understand each other, and to talk about more informal issues. In debate, there are generally two positions and people are generally looking to ‘win’ their side.”45 Debate, cast here as the theoretical scapegoat, provides a convenient, low-water benchmark for explaining how other forms of deliberative interaction better promote cooperative “choice work.” The Kettering-inspired framework receives support from perversions of the debate process such as vapid presidential debates and verbal pyrotechnics found on Crossfire-style television shows.46 In contrast, the intelligence community’s debating initiative stands as a nettlesome anomaly for these theoretical frameworks, with debate serving, rather than frustrating, the ends of deliberation. The presence of such an anomaly would seem to point to the wisdom of fashioning a theoretical orientation that frames the debate-deliberation connection in contingent, rather than static terms, with the relationship between the categories shift ing along with the various contexts in which they manifest in practice.47 Such an approach gestures toward the importance of rhetorically informed critical work on multiple levels. First, the contingency of situated practice invites analysis geared to assess, in particular cases, the extent to which debate practices enable and/ or constrain deliberative objectives. Regarding the intelligence community’s debating initiative, such an analytical perspective highlights, for example, the tight connection between the deliberative goals established by intelligence officials and the cultural technology manifest in the bridge project’s online debating applications such as Hot Grinds. An additional dimension of nuance emerging from this avenue of analysis pertains to the precise nature of the deliberative goals set by bridge. Program descriptions notably eschew Kettering-style references to democratic citizen empowerment, yet feature deliberation prominently as a key ingredient of strong intelligence tradecraft . Th is caveat is especially salient to consider when it comes to the second category of rhetorically informed critical work invited by the contingent aspect of specific debate initiatives. To grasp this layer it is useful to appreciate how the name of the bridge project constitutes an invitation for those outside the intelligence community to participate in the analytic outreach eff ort. According to Doney, bridge “provides an environment for Analytic Outreach—a place where IC analysts can reach out to expertise elsewhere in federal, state, and local government, in academia, and industry. New communities of interest can form quickly in bridge through the ‘web of trust’ access control model—access to minds outside the intelligence community creates an analytic force multiplier.”48 This presents a moment of choice for academic scholars in a position to respond to Doney’s invitation; it is an opportunity to convert scholarly expertise into an “analytic force multiplier.” In reflexively pondering this invitation, it may be valuable for scholars to read Greene and Hicks’s proposition that switch-side debating should be viewed as a cultural technology in light of Langdon Winner’s maxim that “technological artifacts have politics.”49 In the case of bridge, politics are informed by the history of intelligence community policies and practices. Commenter Th omas Lord puts this point in high relief in a post off ered in response to a news story on the topic: “[W]hy should this thing (‘bridge’) be? . . . [Th e intelligence community] on the one hand sometimes provides useful information to the military or to the civilian branches and on the other hand it is a dangerous, out of control, relic that by all external appearances is not the slightest bit reformed, other than superficially, from such excesses as became exposed in the cointelpro and mkultra hearings of the 1970s.”50 A debate scholar need not agree with Lord’s full-throated criticism of the intelligence community (he goes on to observe that it bears an alarming resemblance to organized crime) to understand that participation in the community’s Analytic Outreach program may serve the ends of deliberation, but not necessarily democracy, or even a defensible politics. Demand-driven rhetoric of science necessarily raises questions about what’s driving the demand, questions that scholars with relevant expertise would do well to ponder carefully before embracing invitations to contribute their argumentative expertise to deliberative projects. By the same token, it would be prudent to bear in mind that the technological determinism about switch-side debate endorsed by Greene and Hicks may tend to flatten reflexive assessments regarding the wisdom of supporting a given debate initiative—as the next section illustrates, manifest differences among initiatives warrant context-sensitive judgments regarding the normative political dimensions featured in each case. Public Debates in the EPA Policy Process The preceding analysis of U.S. intelligence community debating initiatives highlighted how analysts are challenged to navigate discursively the heteroglossia of vast amounts of diff erent kinds of data flowing through intelligence streams. Public policy planners are tested in like manner when they attempt to stitch together institutional arguments from various and sundry inputs ranging from expert testimony, to historical precedent, to public comment. Just as intelligence managers find that algorithmic, formal methods of analysis often don’t work when it comes to the task of interpreting and synthesizing copious amounts of disparate data, public-policy planners encounter similar challenges. In fact,the argumentative turn in public-policy planning elaborates an approach to public-policy analysis that foregrounds deliberative interchange and critical thinking as alternatives to “decisionism,” the formulaic application of “objective” decision algorithms to the public policy process. Stating the matter plainly, Majone suggests, “whether in written or oral form, argument is central in all stages of the policy process.” Accordingly, he notes, “we miss a great deal if we try to understand policy-making solely in terms of power, influence, and bargaining, to the exclusion of debate and argument.”51 One can see similar rationales driving Goodwin and Davis’s EPA debating project, where debaters are invited to conduct on-site public debates covering resolutions craft ed to reflect key points of stasis in the EPA decision-making process. For example, in the 2008 Water Wars debates held at EPA headquarters in Washington, D.C., resolutions were crafted to focus attention on the topic of water pollution, with one resolution focusing on downstream states’ authority to control upstream states’ discharges and sources of pollutants, and a second resolution exploring the policy merits of bottled water and toilet paper taxes as revenue sources to fund water infrastructure projects. In the first debate on interstate river pollution, the team of Seth Gannon and Seungwon Chung from Wake Forest University argued in favor of downstream state control, with the Michigan State University team of Carly Wunderlich and Garrett Abelkop providing opposition. In the second debate on taxation policy, Kevin Kallmyer and Matthew Struth from University of Mary Washington defended taxes on bottled water and toilet paper, while their opponents from Howard University, Dominique Scott and Jarred McKee, argued against this proposal. Reflecting on the project, Goodwin noted how the intercollegiate Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science 107 debaters’ ability to act as “honest brokers” in the policy arguments contributed positively to internal EPA deliberation on both issues.52 Davis observed that since the invited debaters “didn’t have a dog in the fight,” they were able to give voice to previously buried arguments that some EPA subject matter experts felt reticent to elucidate because of their institutional affiliations.53 Such findings are consistent with the views of policy analysts advocating the argumentative turn in policy planning. As Majone claims, “Dialectical confrontation between generalists and experts often succeeds in bringing out unstated assumptions, conflicting interpretations of the facts, and the risks posed by new projects.”54 Frank Fischer goes even further in this context, explicitly appropriating rhetorical scholar Charles Willard’s concept of argumentative “epistemics” to flesh out his vision for policy studies: Uncovering the epistemic dynamics of public controversies would allow for a more enlightened understanding of what is at stake in a particular dispute, making possible a sophisticated evaluation of the various viewpoints and merits of different policy options. In so doing, the differing, oft en tacitly held contextual perspectives and values could be juxtaposed; the viewpoints and demands of experts, special interest groups, and the wider public could be directly compared; and the dynamics among the participants could be scrutizined. This would by no means sideline or even exclude scientific assessment; it would only situate it within the framework of a more comprehensive evaluation.55 As Davis notes, institutional constraints present within the EPA communicative milieu can complicate eff orts to provide a full airing of all relevant arguments pertaining to a given regulatory issue. Thus, intercollegiate debaters can play key roles in retrieving and amplifying positions that might otherwise remain sedimented in the policy process. The dynamics entailed in this symbiotic relationship are underscored by deliberative planner John Forester, who observes, “If planners and public administrators are to make democratic political debate and argument possible, they will need strategically located allies to avoid being fully thwarted by the characteristic self-protecting behaviors of the planning organizations and bureaucracies within which they work.”56 Here, an institution’s need for “strategically located allies” to support deliberative practice constitutes the demand for rhetorically informed expertise, setting up what can be considered a demand-driven rhetoric of science. As an instance of rhetoric of science scholarship, this type of “switch-side public 108 Rhetoric & Public Affairs debate” differs both from insular contest tournament debating, where the main focus is on the pedagogical benefit for student participants, and first-generation rhetoric of science scholarship, where critics concentrated on unmasking the rhetoricity of scientific artifacts circulating in what many perceived to be purely technical spheres of knowledge production.58 As a form of demand-driven rhetoric of science, switch-side debating connects directly with the communication field’s performative tradition of argumentative engagement in public controversy—a different route of theoretical grounding than rhetorical criticism’s tendency to locate its foundations in the English field’s tradition of literary criticism and textual analysis.59 Given this genealogy, it is not surprising to learn how Davis’s response to the EPA’s institutional need for rhetorical expertise took the form of a public debate proposal, shaped by Davis’s dual background as a practitioner and historian of intercollegiate debate. Davis competed as an undergraduate policy debater for Howard University in the 1970s, and then went on to enjoy substantial success as coach of the Howard team in the new millennium. In an essay reviewing the broad sweep of debating history, Davis notes, “Academic debate began at least 2,400 years ago when the scholar Protagoras of Abdera (481–411 bc), known as the father of debate, conducted debates among his students in Athens.”60 As John Poulakos points out, “older” Sophists such as Protagoras taught Greek students the value of dissoi logoi, or pulling apart complex questions by debating two sides of an issue.61 The few surviving fragments of Protagoras’s work suggest that his notion of dissoi logoi stood for the principle that “two accounts [logoi] are present about every ‘thing,’ opposed to each other,” and further, that humans could “measure” the relative soundness of knowledge claims by engaging in give-and-take where parties would make the “weaker argument stronger” to activate the generative aspect of rhetorical practice, a key element of the Sophistical tradition.62 Following in Protagoras’s wake, Isocrates would complement this centrifugal push with the pull of synerchesthe, a centripetal exercise of “coming together” deliberatively to listen, respond, and form common social bonds.63 Isocrates incorporated Protagorean dissoi logoi into synerchesthe, a broader concept that he used flexibly to express interlocking senses of (1) inquiry, as in groups convening to search for answers to common questions through discussion;64 (2) deliberation, with interlocutors gathering in a political setting to deliberate about proposed courses of action;65 and (3) alliance formation, a form of collective action typical at festivals,66 or in the exchange of pledges that deepen social ties.67 Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science 109 Returning once again to the Kettering-informed sharp distinction between debate and deliberation, one sees in Isocratic synerchesthe, as well as in the EPA debating initiative, a fusion of debate with deliberative functions. Echoing a theme raised in this essay’s earlier discussion of intelligence tradecraft , such a fusion troubles categorical attempts to classify debate and deliberation as fundamentally opposed activities. Th e significance of such a finding is amplified by the frequency of attempts in the deliberative democracy literature to insist on the theoretical bifurcation of debate and deliberation as an article of theoretical faith. Tandem analysis of the EPA and intelligence community debating initiatives also brings to light dimensions of contrast at the third level of Isocratic synerchesthe, alliance formation. Th e intelligence community’s Analytic Outreach initiative invites largely one-way communication flowing from outside experts into the black box of classified intelligence analysis. On the contrary, the EPA debating program gestures toward a more expansive project of deliberative alliance building. In this vein, Howard University’s participation in the 2008 EPA Water Wars debates can be seen as the harbinger of a trend by historically black colleges and universities (hbcus) to catalyze their debate programs in a strategy that evinces Davis’s dual-focus vision. On the one hand, Davis aims to recuperate Wiley College’s tradition of competitive excellence in intercollegiate debate, depicted so powerfully in the feature film The Great Debaters, by starting a wave of new debate programs housed in hbcus across the nation.68 On the other hand, Davis sees potential for these new programs to complement their competitive debate programming with participation in the EPA’s public debating initiative. Th is dual-focus vision recalls Douglas Ehninger’s and Wayne Brockriede’s vision of “total” debate programs that blend switch-side intercollegiate tournament debating with forms of public debate designed to contribute to wider communities beyond the tournament setting.69 Whereas the political telos animating Davis’s dual-focus vision certainly embraces background assumptions that Greene and Hicks would find disconcerting—notions of liberal political agency, the idea of debate using “words as weapons”70—there is little doubt that the project of pursuing environmental protection by tapping the creative energy of hbcu-leveraged dissoi logoi differs significantly from the intelligence community’s eff ort to improve its tradecraft through online digital debate programming. Such diff erence is especially evident in light of the EPA’s commitment to extend debates to public realms, with the attendant possible benefits unpacked by Jane Munksgaard and Damien Pfister: 110 Rhetoric & Public Affairs Having a public debater argue against their convictions, or confess their indecision on a subject and subsequent embrace of argument as a way to seek clarity, could shake up the prevailing view of debate as a war of words. Public uptake of the possibility of switch-sides debate may help lessen the polarization of issues inherent in prevailing debate formats because students are no longer seen as wedded to their arguments. This could transform public debate from a tussle between advocates, with each public debater trying to convince the audience in a Manichean struggle about the truth of their side, to a more inviting exchange focused on the content of the other’s argumentation and the process of deliberative exchange.71 Reflection on the EPA debating initiative reveals a striking convergence among (1) the expressed need for dissoi logoi by government agency officials wrestling with the challenges of inverted rhetorical situations, (2) theoretical claims by scholars regarding the centrality of argumentation in the public policy process, and (3) the practical wherewithal of intercollegiate debaters to tailor public switch-side debating performances in specific ways requested by agency collaborators. These points of convergence both underscore previously articulated theoretical assertions regarding the relationship of debate to deliberation, as well as deepen understanding of the political role of deliberation in institutional decision making. But they also suggest how decisions by rhetorical scholars about whether to contribute switch-side debating acumen to meet demand-driven rhetoric of science initiatives ought to involve careful reflection. Such an approach mirrors the way policy planning in the “argumentative turn” is designed to respond to the weaknesses of formal, decisionistic paradigms of policy planning with situated, contingent judgments informed by reflective deliberation. Conclusion Dilip Gaonkar’s criticism of first-generation rhetoric of science scholarship rests on a key claim regarding what he sees as the inherent “thinness” of the ancient Greek rhetorical lexicon.72 That lexicon, by virtue of the fact that it was invented primarily to teach rhetorical performance, is ill equipped in his view to support the kind of nuanced discriminations required for eff ective interpretation and critique of rhetorical texts. Although Gaonkar isolates rhetoric of science as a main target of this critique, his choice of subject matter Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science 111 positions him to toggle back and forth between specific engagement with rhetoric of science scholarship and discussion of broader themes touching on the metatheoretical controversy over rhetoric’s proper scope as a field of inquiry (the so-called big vs. little rhetoric dispute).73 Gaonkar’s familiar refrain in both contexts is a warning about the dangers of “universalizing” or “globalizing” rhetorical inquiry, especially in attempts that “stretch” the classical Greek rhetorical vocabulary into a hermeneutic metadiscourse, one pressed into service as a master key for interpretation of any and all types of communicative artifacts. In other words, Gaonkar warns against the dangers of rhetoricians pursuing what might be called supply-side epistemology, rhetoric’s project of pushing for greater disciplinary relevance by attempting to extend its reach into far-flung areas of inquiry such as the hard sciences. Yet this essay highlights how rhetorical scholarship’s relevance can be credibly established by outsiders, who seek access to the creative energy flowing from the classical Greek rhetorical lexicon in its native mode, that is, as a tool of invention designed to spur and hone rhetorical performance. Analysis of the intelligence community and EPA debating initiatives shows how this is the case, with government agencies calling for assistance to animate rhetorical processes such as dissoi logoi (debating different sides) and synerchesthe (the performative task of coming together deliberately for the purpose of joint inquiry, collective choice-making, and renewal of communicative bonds).74 Th is demand-driven epistemology is diff erent in kind from the globalization project so roundly criticized by Gaonkar. Rather than rhetoric venturing out from its own academic home to proselytize about its epistemological universality for all knowers, instead here we have actors not formally trained in the rhetorical tradition articulating how their own deliberative objectives call for incorporation of rhetorical practice and even recruitment of “strategically located allies”75 to assist in the process. Since the productivist content in the classical Greek vocabulary serves as a critical resource for joint collaboration in this regard, demand-driven rhetoric of science turns Gaonkar’s original critique on its head. In fairness to Gaonkar, it should be stipulated that his 1993 intervention challenged the way rhetoric of science had been done to date, not the universe of ways rhetoric of science might be done in the future. And to his partial credit, Gaonkar did acknowledge the promise of a performance-oriented rhetoric of science, especially one informed by classical thinkers other than Aristotle.76 In his Ph.D. dissertation on “Aspects of Sophistic Pedagogy,” Gaonkar documents how the ancient sophists were “the greatest champions” 112 Rhetoric & Public Affairs of “socially useful” science,77 and also how the sophists essentially practiced the art of rhetoric in a translational, performative register: Th e sophists could not blithely go about their business of making science useful, while science itself stood still due to lack of communal support and recognition. Besides, sophistic pedagogy was becoming increasingly dependent on the findings of contemporary speculation in philosophy and science. Take for instance, the eminently practical art of rhetoric. As taught by the best of the sophists, it was not simply a handbook of recipes which anyone could mechanically employ to his advantage. On the contrary, the strength and vitality of sophistic rhetoric came from their ability to incorporate the relevant information obtained from the on-going research in other fields.78 Of course, deep trans-historical diff erences make uncritical appropriation of classical Greek rhetoric for contemporary use a fool’s errand. But to gauge from Robert Hariman’s recent reflections on the enduring salience of Isocrates, “timely, suitable, and eloquent appropriations” can help us postmoderns “forge a new political language” suitable for addressing the complex raft of intertwined problems facing global society. Such retrospection is long overdue, says Hariman, as “the history, literature, philosophy, oratory, art, and political thought of Greece and Rome have never been more accessible or less appreciated.”79 Th is essay has explored ways that some of the most venerable elements of the ancient Greek rhetorical tradition—those dealing with and deliberation—can be retrieved and adapted to answer calls in the contemporary milieu for cultural technologies capable of dealing with one of our time’s most daunting challenges. This challenge involves finding meaning in inverted rhetorical situations characterized by an endemic surplus of heterogeneous content.

## Interp

### A2 Can’t Define Words

#### Yes you can – our interpretation proves there are reasonable ways of interpreting language in context

#### Even if there is no absolute truth, we can create provisional consensus and common understanding

Ferguson and Mansbach 2002

[Yale, Prof of IR at Rutgers, Richard, Prof of IR at Iowa State, *International Relations and the “Third Debate,”* ed. Jarvis]

**Although there may be no such thing as “absolute truth**” (Hollis, 1994:240-247; Fernandez-Armesto, 1997:chap.6), **there is often a sufficient amount of intersubjective consensus to make for a useful conversation.** That conversation may not lead to proofs that satisfy the philosophical nit-pickers, but it can be educational and illuminating. **We gain a degree of apparently useful “understanding” about the things we need (or prefer) to “know.”**

### A2 Resolved/Colon

#### Their “Resolved” and colon arguments make no sense–the affirmative has to defend the proposition that the government should act

Parcher 2001

[Jeff, Fmr. Debate Coach at Georgetown University, February, http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html]

Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. **American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote**. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Frimness of purpose; resolution. 2. **A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statemnt of a deciion, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconcievable.** Why? Context. **The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating**. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desireablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committtee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the prelimanary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) **Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.**

## Limits

### Limits 2NC

#### Their interpretation eviscerates predictable limits – the Steinberg & Freeley evidence explains that there are a literally infinite number of contexts or principles they can enshrine by using the topic as a point of access. Delimiting debate in this manner undermines the political efficacy of discussion by erasing clash.

#### Underlimiting debate ruins the ability to debate in a fashion that can effectuate political change

Deitz 2000

Mary Dietz, Professor of Polisci at Minnesota, 2000 Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 131-2

If another of the imperatives of the political world is to avoid becoming contemptible, then speaking the truth is a good, but not an unalloyed good. The paradoxes of politics tend to wreak havoc with the principles of communication because, as Merleau-Ponty observes, "politics is a relationship to [people]~~men~~ rather than principles" (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 219).32 Thus in politics an openness toward the opinions of others is sometimes not a condition of mutual respect, but antithetical to it. It may be a peculiarity of the political domain that "when every­one can tell you the truth, you lose their respect," but it is a peculiarity that discourse ethicists ignore to their peril (Machiavelli 1950, 87). One might say, then, that speaking the truth is an indispensable element in politics, but not the point of it. To make communicative action, or the enactment of principles of discourse ethics, or moral conversation, the end or goal of politics is to mistake the nature of working in half-truth and thereby misconstrue "the milieu that is proper to politics" itself.The supervenience of strategic (speech) action on communicative (speech) action in politics that I have been alluding to here is what I also think Timothy Garton Ash meant to convey when, in the after­math of the PEN Congress, he referred to the "qualitatively different responsibility" that the intellectual has for "the validity, intellectual coherence, and truth of what he says and writes," as opposed to the politician, who invariably works in half-truth. The point is not that the intellectual lives in a communicative world of validity, coherence, and truth while the politician does not. (Although Habermas's ideal com­munication situation might stand a better chance of realization in a scholarly conference or a graduate seminar, as opposed to a press conference, an election campaign, or even a neighborhood caucus.) The politician also inhabits a world of validity, coherence, and truth. Yet validity, coherence, and truth take on different colorations work­ing in the context peculiar to politics—where strategic imperatives and the exercise of power, conflicts of interest and drives of ambition, are ineliminable aspects of collective action. Hence, it is one thing to encourage (or even insist upon) the intellectual's responsibility to keep providing us with various practical (or even imaginary) means for judging the health or sickness of the body politic, and quite another to expect the politician—or the citizen—to "live" them.

#### Fairness is a decision rule—it rigs the game and makes neutral evaluation by a judge impossible—their ability to pick the high ground is an inequality that ought to be eliminated.

Loland 2002

[Sigmund, Professor of Sport Philosophy and Ethics at the Norwegian University of Sport and Physical Education, *Fair Play and Sport*, 95]

Rule violations are of several kinds. The long jumper who steps over the board has her jump measured longer than it really is. By illegally hitting a competitor on the arm, a basketball player ‘steals’ the ball and scores two points. I have argued that without adhering to a shared, just ethos, evaluations of performance among competitors become invalid. Advantages resulting from rule violations that are no part of such an ethos must be considered non-relevant inequalities that ought to be eliminated or compensated for. The argument is similar to that in the discussion of equality. This time, however, we are dealing not with external conditions, equipment, or support systems, but with competitors’ actions themselves.

### A2 Critical Thinking

#### This applies more to them. Every debate they have is about their argument. Disregarding the topic is a way to hide in their comfort zone and avoid the spontaneous anxiety of preparing a new Cuba Neg for every tournament.

#### Relative predictability is key to depth of preparation and discussion --- both enable critical thinking

Mandernach 2006

[B. Jean, Ph.D. and Professor of Psychology – Park University, “Thinking Critically about Critical Thinking: Integrating Online Tools to Promote Critical Thinking”, InSight: A Collection of Faculty Scholarship, Vol. 1, p. 45-46]

Online Asynchronous Threaded Discussions – Threaded discussion boards provide an opportunity to take advantage of the benefits of student-teacher and student-student interaction in an environment that encourages planned, meaningful, prepared discussion (MacKnight, 2000; Muirhead, 2002; Murchu & Muirhead, 2002; Peirce, 2003; Walker, 2005). Supplementing the time-based, spontaneous interaction that occurs in a face-to-face classroom, threaded discussions create an outlet for in-depth interactions that may require additional thought, investigation or research. While threaded discussions are not necessarily better than classroom discussions, they provide an alternate avenue for facilitating a different type of critical thinking than can be promoted through spontaneous interactions. For online discussions to be meaningful and engaging, it is vital that they are structured in a manner that effectively facilitates critical thinking (Hanna, Glowacki-Dudka & Conceicao-Runlee, 2000; Horton, 2000). As such, it is essential that threaded discussions are based upon discussable questions, problems, debates or situations (i.e., you do not want to utilize discussion questions that have a definite answer or require little investigation). To encourage on-going thought and in-depth analysis of an issue, it is recommended that instructors facilitate threaded discussions utilizing a range of convergent, divergent and evaluative questions. As recommended by Collision, Elbaum, Havvind and Tinker (2000), effective threaded discussions integrate full-spectrum questions that encourage critical thinking by 1) probing the “so what!” response targeting relevance, interest level, urgency and context; 2) clarifying meaning or conceptual vocabulary as they challenge ambiguity, vagueness and common misconceptions; 3) exploring assumptions, sources and rationale; 4) seeking to identify causes and effects/outcomes including primary or secondary sources, and internal or external factors; and 5) considering the appropriateness of various courses of action.

### A2 Education OWs Fairness

#### Fairness is a prerequisite to education—if we can’t engage on a level playing field, we can’t test them adequately—clash is the key to understanding arguments.

Zappen 2004

[James Zappen, Professor of Language and Literature at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, “The Rebirth of Dialogue: Bakhtin, Socrates, and the Rhetorical Tradition,” p. 35-36]

Finally, Bakhtin describes the Socratic dialogue as a carnivalesque debate between opposing points of view, with a ritualistic crownings and decrownings of opponents. I call this Socratic form of debate a contesting of ideas to capture the double meaning of the Socratic debate as both a mutual testing of oneself and others and a contesting or challenging of others' ideas and their lives. Brickhouse and Smith explain that Socrates' testing of ideas and people is a mutual testing not only of others but also of himself: Socrates claims that he has been commanded by the god to examine himself as well as others; he claims that the unexamined life is not worth living; and, since he rarely submits to questioning himself, "it must be that in the process of examining others Socrates regards himself as examining his own life, too." Such a mutual testing of ideas provides the only claim to knowledge that Socrates can have: since neither he nor anyone else knows the real definitions of things, he cannot claim to have any knowledge of his own; since, however, he subjects his beliefs to repeated testing, he can claim to have that limited human knowledge supported by the "inductive evidence" of "previous elenctic examinations." This mutual testing of ideas and people is evident in the Laches and also appears in the Gorgias in Socrates' testing of his own belief that courage is inseparable from the other virtues and in his willingness to submit his belief and indeed his life to the ultimate test of divine judgment, in what Bakhtin calls a dialogue on the threshold. The contesting or challenging of others' ideas and their lives and their ritualistic crowning/decrowning is evident in the Gorgias in Soocrates' successive refutations and humiliations of Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles.

#### We solve the impact—fairness through topicality fosters tolerance of alternative viewpoints

Muir 1993

[Star Muir, Professor of Communication at George Mason, “A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate,” *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 26.4, p. 291-292]

Firm moral commitment to a value system, however, along with a sense of moral identity, is founded in reflexive assessments of multiple perspectives. Switch-side debate is not simply a matter of speaking persuasively or organizing ideas clearly (although it does involve these), but of understanding and mobilizing arguments to make an effective case. Proponents of debating both sides observe that the debaters should prepare the best possible case they can, given the facts and information available to them.52 This process, at its core, involves critical assessment and evaluation of arguments; it is a process of critical thinking not available with many traditional teaching methods.53 We must progressively learn to recognize how often the concepts of others are discredited by the concepts we use to justify ourselves to ourselves. We must come to see how often our claims are compelling only when expressed in our own egocentric view. We can do this if we learn the art of using concepts without living in them. This is possible only when the intellectual act of stepping outside of our own systems of belief has become second nature, a routine and ordinary responsibility of everyday living. Neither academic schooling nor socialization has yet addressed this moral responsibility,54 but switch-side debating fosters this type of role playing and generates reasoned moral positions based in part on values of tolerance and fairness. Yes, there may be a dangerous sense of competitive pride that comes with successfully advocating a position against one's own views, and there are ex-debaters who excuse their deceptive practices by saying "I'm just doing my job." Ultimately, however, sound convictions are distinguishable from emphatic convictions by a consideration of all sides of a moral stance. Moral education is not a guaranteed formula for rectitude, but the central tendencies of switch-side debate are in line with convictions built on empathic appreciation for alternative points of view and a reasoned assessment of arguments both pro and con. Tolerance, as an alternative to dogmatism, is preferable, not because it invites a relativistic view of the world, but because in a framework of equal access to ideas and equal opportunities for expression, the truth that emerges is more defensible and more justifiable. Morality, an emerging focal point of controversy in late twentieth-century American culture, is fostered rather than hampered by empowering students to form their own moral identity.

### A2 Exclusion

#### 1. No impact—there’s no reason any particular person or assertion should be guaranteed a win or even allowed to debate.

#### No link—goal oriented responsiveness isn’t exclusionary—their offense doesn’t assume game spaces

Walton 2004

[Douglas, Full Professor of Philosophy – U Winnipeg, Relevance in Argumentation, p. 169-170]

The kind of **relevance** defined in the new theory **can be called dialectical relevance, meaning that an argument**, a question, or other type of speech act **is judged to be relevant insofar as it plays a part, or has a function, in a** **goal-directed** conversation that is a dialogue exchange **between two participants who are aware of each other’s moves.** The ultimate aim of a system of dialectical relevance is to be useful in judging cases for material relevance, primarily cases where an argument is central. To judge whether a given argument is normatively relevant, basically one has to judge whether, as used in the given case, it meets the normative standards of reasonable argument appropriate for that case. To determine what normative standard is appropriate, one has to ask the basic question, What purpose is the argument supposedly being used for? To answer that question, one has to examine the evidence given in the text and context of dialogue in that case and ask what type of dialogue this case is supposed to be part of. Then the more detailed evaluation can go from there, depending on the goal of that type of dialogue. For example, suppose the dialogue is supposed to be a critical discussion. The purpose of a critical discussion is to resolve a conflict of opinions. Thus, the argument in the given case can be judged to be relevant if it used in such a way as to contribute to the resolution of the conflict of opinions supposedly at issue in the critical discussion. The argument is relevant if it contributes to the goal of the critical discussion at whatever stage it was used. It is irrelevant if it does not. Why should argumentation in a natural conversation be assumed to be goal directed? One might object that a lot of the ordinary conversations we have in everyday life do not appear to be goal directed. Two people may meet in the street and have a casual conversation about whether it is a nice day or not. It would seem to be artificial to describe their conversation as goal directed, implying that the two had agreed in advance to undertake this argument about the weather for some specific purpose. If they switch to talking about something else, is that a bad thing? Should it be criticized as “irrelevant”? If not, the problem is that a criticism of irrelevance seems arbitrary or even unfair. The solution to this problem is to clearly recognize that **judgments about** the **dialectical relevance** of an argument **confer a stamp of approval of admissibility** on the argument as rational or as used correctly in a given case with respect to its serving some purpose. **To say that an argument is** dialectically **relevant or irrelevant is not to say that it is** faulty or **fallacious** in every respect or that it has been incorrectly with respect to every goal that the participants are trying to achieve in a given case. There is a parallel here with applying deductive logic to arguments. To say that an argument is deductively valid is not to say that is good argument in every respect or that it is fallacy free. For a deductively valid argument could be based on false premises, or it could be a circular argument, or it could exhibit many kinds of faults. To say that an argument is deductively valid is only to say that the argument is correct or rational in a conditional sense—it is to say that if the premises are true, then the conclusion must (by logical necessity) be true too. Comparably, **to say that an argument is dialectically relevant** in a given case is not to say that the argument is perfectly rational, in relation to any goals that might be important the participants. It **is only to say that it has the potential to be used** correctly or rationally **in a** conditional or **instrumental sense**. It is to say that the argument has the potential to be used in such a way as to contribute to the type of discussion the participants are supposed to be engaged in. But you can always raise the question of what type of discussion the participants should really be engaged in. You can ask whether the agenda of that discussion ought to be changed if they are to solve the underlying problem they confront. **So if two disputants are arguing about the weather, and one** of **them suddenly starts to argue about baseball** or the price of new cars, the switch of topics is not necessarily a bad thing at all. But from the perspective of the two arguers who hope to resolve their difference of opinions about the weather by using rational argumentation, the switch to baseball **may be viewed as dialectically irrelevant**. This means that **it turns the argumentation away from** the direction needed for **fulfilling** its original **purpose**. At any rate, we can see that dialectical **relevance** has its place. Although it is not a requirement of all human communication, it **is a useful requirement for reasoned argumentation** of various kinds **that are quite important in human communication.**

#### Our ground claims turn their exclusion arguments – make it impossible to be neg

Galloway 2007

[Ryan Galloway, Assistant Professor and Director of Debate at Samford University, 2007, “Dinner and Conversation at the Argumentative Table: Re-Conceptualizing Debate As An Argumentative Dialogue,” *Contemporary Argumentation & Debate*, Volume 28, September, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Premier, p. 12]

While affirmative teams often accuse the negative of using a juridical rule to exclude them, the affirmative also relies upon an unstated rule to exclude the negative response. This unstated but understood rule is that the negative speech act must serve to negate the affirmative act. Thus, affirmative teams often exclude an entire range of negative arguments, including arguments designed to challenge the hegemony, domination, and oppression inherent in topical approaches to the resolution. Becoming more than just a ritualistic tag-line of “fairness, education, time skew, voting issue,” fairness exists in the implicit right to be heard in a meaningful way. Ground is just that—a ground to stand on, a ground to speak from, a ground by which to meaningfully contribute to an ongoing conversation

### A2 Fairness Rigged (Delgado)

#### There's a distinction between institutional and competitive fairness—neither team solves the fact that economic inequality, personal obligations, and geography influence success, but their remedy makes it worse.

#### Turn—Unlimited topics are more exploitable by teams with large research capacities. Means they don’t solve either

#### The argument that our framework is systemically bias is a self-serving assertion to sidestep clash—all of their reasons not to defend the topic can be appropriated by actors with opposite goals

Talisse 2005

[Robert, philosophy professor at Vanderbilt, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 31.4, “Deliberativist responses to activist challenges”] \*note: gendered language in this article refers to arguments made by two specific individuals in an article by Iris Young

My call for a more detailed articulation of the second activist challenge may be met with the radical claim that I have begged the question. It may be said that my analysis of the activist’s challenge and my request for a more rigorous argument presume what the activist denies, namely, that arguments and reasons operate independently of ideology. Here the activist might begin to think that he made a mistake in agreeing to engage in a discussion with a deliberativist – his position throughout the debate being that one should decline to engage in argument with one’s opponents! He may say that of course activism seems lacking to a deliberativist, for the deliberativist measures the strength of a view according to her own standards. But the activist rejects those standards, claiming that they are appropriate only for seminar rooms and faculty meetings, not for real-world politics. Consequently the activist may say that by agreeing to enter into a discussion with the deliberativist, he had unwittingly abandoned a crucial element of his position. He may conclude that the consistent activist avoids arguing altogether, and communicates only with his comrades. Here the discussion ends. However, the deliberativist has a further consideration to raise as his discursive partner departs for the next rally or street demonstration. The foregoing debate had presumed that there is but one kind of activist and but one set of policy objectives that activists may endorse. Yet Young’s activist is opposed not only by deliberative democrats, but also by persons who also call themselves ‘activists’ and who are committed to a set of policy objectives quite different from those endorsed by this one activist. Once these opponents are introduced into the mix, the stance of Young’s activist becomes more evidently problematic, even by his own standards. To explain: although Young’s discussion associates the activist always with politically progressive causes, such as the abolition of the World Trade Organization (109), the expansion of healthcare and welfare programs (113), and certain forms of environmentalism (117), not all activists are progressive in this sense. Activists on the extreme and racist Right claim also to be fighting for justice, fairness, and liberation. They contend that existing processes and institutions are ideologically hegemonic and distorting. Accordingly, they reject the deliberative ideal on the same grounds as Young’s activist. They advocate a program of political action that operates outside of prevailing structures, disrupting their operations and challenging their legitimacy. They claim that such action aims to enlighten, inform, provoke, and excite persons they see as complacent, naïve, excluded, and ignorant. Of course, these activists vehemently oppose the policies endorsed by Young’s activist; they argue that justice requires activism that promotes objectives such as national purity, the disenfranchisement of Jews, racial segregation, and white supremacy. More importantly, they see Young’s activist’s vocabulary of ‘inclusion’, ‘structural inequality’, ‘institutionalized power’, as fully in line with what they claim is a hegemonic ideology that currently dominates and systematically distorts our political discourses.21 The point here is not to imply that Young’s activist is no better than the racist activist. The point rather is that Young’s activist’s arguments are, in fact, adopted by activists of different stripes and put in the service of a wide range of policy objectives, each claiming to be just, liberatory, and properly inclusive.22 In light of this, there is a question the activist must confront. How should he deal with those who share his views about the proper means for bringing about a more just society, but promote a set of ends that he opposes? It seems that Young’s activist has no way to deal with opposing activist programs except to fight them or, if fighting is strategically unsound or otherwise problematic, to accept a Hobbesian truce. This might not seem an unacceptable response in the case of racists; however, the question can be raised in the case of any less extreme but nonetheless opposed activist program, including different styles of politically progressive activism. Hence the deliberativist raises her earlier suspicions that, in practice, activism entails a politics based upon interestbased power struggles amongst adversarial factions.

### A2 Limits Kill Education

#### Constraints are more conducive to creative thinking—following the rules is key to innovation.

Gibbert et al. 2007

[Michael Gibbert, Assistant Professor of Management at Bocconi University (Italy), et al., with Martin Hoeglis, Professor of Leadership and Human Resource Management at WHU—Otto Beisheim School of Management (Germany), and Lifsa Valikangas, Professor of Innovation Management at the Helsinki School of Economics (Finland) and Director of the Woodside Institute, 2007 (“In Praise of Resource Constraints,” *MIT Sloan Management Review*, Spring, Available Online at https://umdrive.memphis.edu/gdeitz/public/The%20Moneyball%20Hypothesis/Gibbert%20et%20al.%20-%20SMR%20(2007)%20Praise%20Resource%20Constraints.pdf, Accessed 04-08-2012, p. 15-16)

Resource constraints can also fuel innovative team performance directly. In the spirit of the proverb "necessity is the mother of invention," [end page 15] teams may produce better results because of resource constraints. Cognitive psychology provides experimental support for the "less is more" hypothesis. For example, scholars in creative cognition find in laboratory tests that subjects are most innovative when given fewer rather than more resources for solving a problem.

The reason seems to be that the human mind is most productive when restricted. Limited—or better focused—by specific rules and constraints, we are more likely to recognize an unexpected idea. Suppose, for example, that we need to put dinner on the table for unexpected guests arriving later that day. The main constraints here are the ingredients available and how much time is left. One way to solve this problem is to think of a familiar recipe and then head off to the supermarket for the extra ingredients. Alternatively, we may start by looking in the refrigerator and cupboard to see what is already there, then allowing ourselves to devise innovative ways of combining subsets of these ingredients. Many cooks attest that the latter option, while riskier, often leads to more creative and better appreciated dinners. In fact, it is the option invariably preferred by professional chefs.

The heightened innovativeness of such "constraints-driven" solutions comes from team members' tendencies, under the circumstances, to look for alternatives beyond "how things are normally done," write C. Page Moreau and Darren W. Dahl in a 2005 Journal of Consumer Research article. Would-be innovators facing constraints are more likely to find creative analogies and combinations that would otherwise be hidden under a glut of resources.

### A2 Topicality is Violent

#### There’s no impact to this violence or exclusion – voting against them because their advocacy is unfair doesn’t actually hurt them at all nor does it deal a blow to their project because it will just force them to craft their advocacy in a way that is more fair and thus more successful

#### Attempting to establish conventions for discourse is an attempt at consensus-building not violent exclusion

Dietz 2000

Mary Dietz, Professor of Polisci at Minnesota, 2000 Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 123-4

Habermas's distinction between "pure" communicative action and strategic action raises many difficulties, not the least of which is its adherence to an idealized model of communication that, as Habermas himself acknowledges, does not fit a great deal of everyday social interaction (McCarthy 1991,132). Machiavelli's famous riposte to those thinkers who "have imagined republics and principalities which have never been seen or known to exist in reality" (Machiavelli 1950, 56) seems pertinent here, for the idealized model that Habermas imagines and the distinction that supports it appear boldly to deny the Machia­vellian insight that "how we live is so far removed from how we ought to live, that he who abandons what is done for what ought to be done, will rather learn to bring about his own ruin than his pres­ervation" (56). I will return to this point as it relates to politics later. For now, it is important to underscore that Habermas relies upon the communicative-strategic distinction to do at least two things: first, to show that on the level of linguistics, communicative action enjoys an "originary" priority over strategic and all other modes of linguistic usage, which are themselves "parasitic" (Rasmussen 1990, 38) or "de­rivative" (McCarthy 1991, 133) upon the former.12 Second, on the level of political theory, Habermas introduces the distinction in order to limit the exercise of threats and coercion (or strategic action) by enu­merating a formal-pragmatic system of discursive accountability (or communicative action) that is geared toward human agreement and mutuality. Despite its thoroughly modern accouterments, communica­tive action aims at something like the twentieth-century discourse-equivalent of the chivalric codes of the late Middle Ages; as a normative system it articulates the conventions of fair and honorable engage­ment between interlocutors. To be sure, Habermas's concept of com­municative action is neither as refined nor as situationally embedded as were the protocols that governed honorable combat across Euro­pean cultural and territorial boundaries and between Christian knights; but it is nonetheless a (cross-cultural) protocol for all that. The entire framework that Habermas establishes is an attempt to limit human violence by elaborating a code of communicative conduct that is de­signed to hold power in check by channeling it into persuasion, or the "unforced" force of the better argument (Habermas 1993b, 160).^

#### This is not a reason to vote affirmative - Resistance to the constraints of the topic/debate is discursive evasion that neutralizes most of the relevant negative ground. By refusing to take a stand for limited discourse they undermine the point of judging between competitors in the first place

Shively 2000

Ruth Lessl Shively, Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M, 2000 Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 188-9

This is why the ambiguists need to do more than call for a whole­sale resistance to categories. Because resistance to some categorizations always involves acceptance of others, they need to own up to, and justify, their own choices.6 If they propose that we choose their version of reality and their favored categorizations, they must give us reasons. If they think we ought to be skeptical ambiguists rather than truth- or harmony-seekers, they must make a case for this prescription. Simply being against established categories is disingenuous when the argu­ment is designed to establish new categories in replace of the old. We are brought back, then, to the issues of rational judgment and persuasion. Earlier I argued that political contest rests on certain un-contested foundations or rational conditions. Here I have added that the policy of anti-categorization rests on certain stable categories of its own. Thus, the subversives are not free from the responsibility of choosing and justifying the subversive categories that define and guide them. For once we recognize the inescapability of choosing categories, we see that subversion or any other political project is a matter of choosing the right categories, not of escaping them. Thus, to be truly subversive requires taking a stand: judging what is good and bad, legitimate and illegitimate, allowed and disallowed, in the best sub­versive society. The desire to avoid this sort of judgment is understandable, for it tends to be associated with intolerant and oppressive attitudes and behaviors. And the situations within which we must judge are often dauntingly complex and uncertain. Rarely can we be certain that our judgments are right. Nonetheless, judgments must be made—not only in the develop­ment of political theory, but also in confronting the decisions of every­day political life. Thus, even in the face of great uncertainty and ambiguity, we are compelled to act and, in so doing, to judge what is good and bad, reasonable and unreasonable, and so on. The ambiguity of our situation does nothing, as such, to alter the need for judgment. As John Courtney Murray writes, to say that uncertainty and complexity must keep us from judging or acting is as senseless as a surgeon in the midst of a gastroenterostomy [saying] that the highly complex situation in front of him is so full of paradox ("The patient is at once receiving blood and losing it"), and irony ("Half a stomach will be better than a whole one") and dilemma ("Not too much, nor too little, anesthesia") that all surgical solutions are necessarily am­biguous. (Murray 1960, 283) Political Theory and the Postmodern Politics of Ambiguity The point, of course, is that there is no avoiding judgment and action here, and that in political theory and politics, as in surgery, we are often compelled to deal with the complexities we meet as best we can. Thus, if we must judge, there is no point in trying to avoid the task through a policy of indiscriminate subversion. Our choice is not whether to judge, but whether to judge through open, reasoned argu­ment or not. And the point of this essay has been to say that the former option is best.

## Education

### Education 2NC

#### Our interpretation accesses the best model for education.

#### Diversity – topical education forces changes in the discussion from year to year, their interpretation allows debate to become stagnant because teams can read the same aff no matter what – this is proven by the fact that schools have run the same arguments on different topics

#### Simulating government action is key to our skills offense—breaks out of traditional pedagogy and enhances active learning—even if we aren’t in positions of power

Esberg & Sagan 2012

[Jane Esberg is special assistant to the director at New York University's Center on. International Cooperation. She was the winner of 2009 Firestone Medal, AND \*\*Scott Sagan is a professor of political science and director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation “NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy,” 2/17 The Nonproliferation Review, 19:1, 95-108

These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by **students in educational simulations.** Government participants learn about the importance of **understanding foreign perspectives,** the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to **overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia**,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict.6 The **skills of imagination** and the subsequent ability to **predict** foreign interests and reactions remain **critical for real-world foreign policy makers**. For example, simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis\*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts\*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7 By **university age**, **students** often have a **pre-defined view** **of international affairs**, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises **force students to** **challenge** **their** **assumptions** about how other governments behave and how their own government works.8 Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, **educational literature** has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by **breaking from the typical lecture format**, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to **link fact and theory**, providing a context for facts while bringing theory into the realm of practice.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: **they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux**.’’11 Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12 **Role-playing exercises** certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts\* but they learn them in a **more active style**. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research ‘‘their’’ government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach students **how to contextualize and act on information.**14

#### Case studies prove—policy simulations make students re-examine assumptions and use critical theory to affect change

Kupperman et al 2005

[Jeff, Gary Weisserman, associate professor of education at UM Flint, core member of Michigan's Interactive Communications & Simulations group, \*\*head of the Oakland Early College “Curriculum games: An online character-playing project as "ironist curriculum"”, http://blog.jkupp.com/files/curriculum\_games.pdf)

This paper is a mixture of narrative and theory. The narratives were collected from a project called Conflix, in which we aimed to create a new kind of social studies course for high school and college students, through the use of character-play, the web, and a game-like system for making decisions and wielding power. The theory grew out of our reflections on these narratives, as we realized that while our students overwhelmingly indicated that their experiences in the project were engaging and educative, the way that students learn in Conflix contrasts sharply with commonly held assumptions about learning goals and curriculum. Mirroring the way that Conflix has developed through cycles of theory, practice, and reflection, our paper blends narratives from the development and enactment of the project with explorations of the idea of "ironist curriculum." We use the term "ironist curriculum" to describe an approach to educational goals that embraces the contingent and context-dependent nature of those goals. We believe that a narrative format is particularly appropriate to the idea of ironist curriculum because, in contrast to the traditional research paper format, narrative is friendly to surprise, ambiguity, and individual interpretation: things that are eschewed by traditional research methods and traditional curricula (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000; Jackson, 1995; Sawyer, 2004), but which are at the heart of an ironist approach to curriculum. The scene: Gary's classroom in a suburban high school. It is 7:40 on a blustery October morning, and the bell hasn't rung yet for first hour. Students began to stagger in twenty minutes ago, some in pairs, many yawning or carrying paper cups from the nearby Starbucks, which does a brisk business just before school. "Need my caffeine fix," explains a boy wearing a football practice jersey. Barry's not much of a Starbucks guy, but today he walks in with a double latte, looking happy but a bit more worn than usual. "You should have seen me last night. My legs were killing me by halfway through," he says, and you might think, what does he play? Fullback? Wideout? Actually, neither: he plays a conservative southern senator, a middle-of-the-road western governor and a liberal midwestern mayor in a web-based political simulation game called Conflix. Last night, you learn, was a LiveWired! session, a live-chat talk show hosted by the project directors (including Jeff and Gary – the authors of this paper) and older "mentors," playing Matt Drudge, Tom Brokaw, and Connie Chung. Two of Barry's characters were featured guests. "I couldn't log in as two of my guys at once for the interview," he says. "So I logged in as one guy on my parents' computer upstairs, and as the other in the den downstairs. It was tough, especially when I had to argue with myself." He rolls up his pants leg. "I scraped the crap out of my shin, too. I rammed it into the desk by the stairway when I tried to jump the last few steps to get to the downstairs keyboard." Briefly, you imagine him limping as an old man, thanks to an old internet injury. Peter walks in. His mayor has been embroiled in controversy, having been accused of embezzlement. (Asked about it, he explained proudly, "I found a bug in the software that allowed me to transfer negative money to my own account.") Financial anarchy ensued, as other characters caught on. On LiveWired!, though, he had been blindsided by Drudge, who presented him with a soon-to-be-published account that he had masterminded the fund-transferring scheme. Now, his character was likely to be subpoenaed, perhaps impeached. At the very least, his power ranking was certain to suffer. "Did you hear that?" Peter asks wryly. "That was the sound of the other shoe dropping." Barry, 17, and Peter, 16, are enrolled in two of Gary's classes: AP American History and a course simply called "Conflix." In many ways, Conflix is the antithesis of the AP course. There are no exams, no textbook or long research papers. Certain kinds of cheating and deception are not only tolerated but actively encouraged. Most importantly, there is no curriculum in the traditional sense of the term, which means no two cohorts (or students) are likely to wind up with exactly the same experience. Which isn't to say that it's thoughtless, or that activity isn't well considered. Quite the opposite, in fact: we care a great deal about what Barry, Peter, and their classmates learn, and expend enormous energy towards making their learning valuable. We expect them to work hard, communicate clearly, gain knowledge about relevant issues, support their positions with evidence, learn research skills, employ clever strategies, and, in general, think deeply about government and the American political system. It's just that we don't know exactly what those thoughts will be, or when and how they will come upon them. In fact, we hope they learn something that is very different from what the standards and benchmarks say Barry and Peter should learn. We want them, in short, to think ironically about what school (and society) says they need to know. We would not argue that games like Conflix should replace all traditional curricula. Rather, we would like to hold up Conflix as a form of what we have come to call "ironist social studies curriculum." We use the term "irony" (along with the terms "ironic" and "ironist") in the sense of "incongruity between what might be expected and what actually occurs" (The American heritage dictionary of the English language, 2000). While the word "irony" is often associated with humor, we are not implying that social studies curriculum should be treated as a joke. Rather, we use the term to mean a curriculum that embraces surprise and contrast with what is expected. In schools, however, curriculum is most often oriented toward the expected, in what Pinar terms a "traditionalist" approach. Objectives are taken for granted and therefore seldom questioned. Curricular improvement is a technical matter, much like "adjusting an automobile engine part in order to make it function more effectively" (Pinar, 1978). This approach can also be called an "essentialist" approach (Rorty, 1989), in that truth is understood to be stable, definable, and acceptable on the basis of "common sense." In social studies terms, that often means emphasizing the transmission of a specific cultural canon (e.g., "America stands for liberty"). A somewhat more nuanced approach could be called "metaphysical inquiry": an approach that says, "right now we may not necessarily know what the truth is, but it exists and we can search for it." Applied to curriculum design, this is similar to what Pinar (1978) calls the "conceptual-empiricist" approach, where social science methods are used to determine which models are most effective. In terms of social studies, this approach often involves the process of "searching" for a final definition of public concepts such as justice, liberty, and democratic citizenship; or an ultimately defensible prioritization of competing values. In practice, however, a metaphysical inquiry approach can easily end up being essentialism in disguise: just as a chemistry teacher may know exactly what her students will "discover" from their "experiments," social studies teachers often decide well in advance what kinds of "truth" we are willing to accept as valid. These approaches have not gone unchallenged. For several decades, critical theorists and other curriculum "reconceptualists" (Pinar, 1978) have advocated an approach that attempts to see through "conventional wisdom" and reveal the power structures and interests which have given rise to currently accepted "truths." The problem with critical theory, some have pointed out, is that it doesn't help teachers figure out what to do, once the prevailing orthodoxies have been cut down (Hlebowitsh, 1993). Furthermore**,** rejection of the status quo can itself become an orthodoxy*.* Most importantly, in our view, critical theory fails to emphasizethe fundamental powerthe act of redescription**,** of creating new vocabularies, can have in creating a more just distribution of power.

### A2 Accessibility

#### Role playing solves —ideal for people with limited topic knowledge.

Schaap 2005

(Andrew, University of Melbourne, Politics, Vol 25 Iss 1, February)

#2 Concern and respect for students and student learning: **Using the role play encouraged students to express ideas in terms of the concepts associated with the particular ideology they were asked to engage with. A particular advantage of the role play was that it enabled students to learn from each other; students with different levels of competence in political theory benefited from the questions and explanations that they gave to each other.** Moreover, the teacher naturally assumes a generous disposition in this situation as students ask for advice, help, clarification, etc. throughout the session. # 3 Appropriate assessment and feedback: The role play provided immediate opportunities to provide students with feedback on their ideas. Like Levy, I tended not to correct misinformation. However, I did reward students by pointing out when a particularly good point was being made. I also recorded the meeting so that students could listen to the discussion later and I posted the various draft declarations of human rights on the subject website. # 4 Clear goals and intellectual challenge: When devising the role play I was forced to articulate the learning outcomes I hoped to achieve more clearly than I had done when preparing regular lectures. This may have been related to the high-risk nature of this teaching method and my worry that students would not take it seriously if they could not see the point of it. **A particular advantage of this teaching method is that it posed an intellectual challenge to students, regardless of their level of competence in the subject.**

### A2 Competiton Bad

#### Competition in debate is good—it encourages education, strong community, and increases quality of work

Gillespie and Gordon 2006

(William and Elizabeth, Kennesaw State University, “Competition, Role-Playing, and Political Science Education,” Sep 1, http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/1/5/1/0/0/pages151007/p151007-1.php)

But, for the most part, coaches report that **the competitive element enhances learning in several ways**. First, many coaches perceive that **competition motivates their students to put in the time and do their best work**. Some indicate that **no other means of motivation is as effective. Engaging in competition allows students to measure their progress. It also provides a goal, raises the stakes of the activity, and provides more rewards**. Second, as one coach said, “**the activity faithfully recreates many of the dynamics of the adversarial model**, and my students report learning a lot.” **For the goal of substantive learning about how American law functions**, especially in litigation, **competition is an essential element**. Mock trial allows students to experience some of the processes, constraints, and emotions associated with competition in a courtroom. Third, **the stress of competition itself helps students gain flexibility and adaptability. Many coaches mention the ability to “think on one’s feet” as a skill that students acquire in the fluid environment of** a mock trial **competition. “Competition enhances the learning experience. The students seem to absorb lessons more quickly and thoroughly under fir**e,” writes one coach. Another writes: “**They also learn to adjust and adapt quickly to the different evaluators. That is something they don't get from their regular classes**.” Fourth, some coaches explain that **competing against other schools allows their students to learn by seeing different approaches to the same case.** Representative comments along these lines include: “Students get to see what other teams do and learn from those experiences.” “[Competition] exposes the students to different techniques and approaches that the other teams use.” Fifth, many coaches explain that the **competition enhances camaraderie and teamwork among their students**. One coach explains **that competition “gives a sense of duty to fulfill an obligation to their fellow teammates.” “Students learn teamwork in an interactive and dynamic setting**,” reports another.

### A2 Framework Isn’t Educational

#### Precisely defining terms is pedagogically valuable—T debates provide portable skills needed to settle all major questions

Steinberg & Freeley 2008

[Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp61-63]

I. THE IMPORTANCE OF DEFINING TERMS The **definition of terms**—the advocate's supported interpretation of the meaning of the words in a proposition—is an **essential part** of debate. In some instances the opposing advocates will agree right away on the definition of terms, and the debate will move on to other issues. In other cases the locus of the debate may be the definition of a key term or terms, and definitions become the "voting issue" that decides the debate. In **all debates**, however, a **shared understanding** of the **interpretation of the proposition** is **necessary** to **guide argumentation** and **decision making.** Many intercollegiate debate propositions call for the "federal government" to adopt a certain policy. Often the term is self-evident in the context of the proposition, and no definition is necessary. In debates on the 2001-2002 CEDA proposition. "Resolved: That the United States Federal Government should substantially increase federal control throughout Indian Country in one or more of the following areas: child welfare, criminal justice, employment, environmental protection, gaming, resource management, taxation," the affirmative merely designated the appropriate federal agency (for example. The bureau of Indian Affairs or the Environmental Protection Agency) to cam' out its policy, and the debate moved on to other issues. However, sometimes other terms in the proposition (for instance, Indian Country) become critical issues of the debate. Not infrequently the negative will raise the issue of topicality and argue that the affirmative's plan is not the best definition, or interpretation, of the proposition. In debates on propositions of value, the clash over definitions or criteria may be crucial to the outcome. In debates outside the educational setting, the same situation prevails. In some debates the definition of terms is easy and obvious—they need only be stated "for the record." and the debate proceeds to other issues. In other debates however, the definition may be **all-important.** For instance physicians, clerics, and ethicists conduct long, hard-fought debates on the critical issue of when life begins: At conception? When the fetus becomes capable of surviving outside the womb? When the brain begins to function? Or at the moment of birth? Exactly the opposite problem arose, and continues, in debates over the use of organ transplants. Does death occur when breathing slops? When the heart stops? Or when the brain ceases to function? Some states have debated this Issue and adopted new definitions of death; in other states the debate continues. Similarly, environmentalists seeking protection from development for valued resources debate the definition of wetlands in public hearings; owners of sports franchises work to redefine players' salaries to fit within predetermined salary caps; and customers considering new product purchases study competing definitions of value. In February 2004, President Bush called upon the Congress to "promptly pass and send to the states for ratification, an amendment to our Constitution defining and protecting marriage as a union of a man and a woman as husband and wife." This advocacy by the president was an attempt to define "marriage" in such a way as to limit it to heterosexual couples. A public debate about the meaning of marriage, and its alternative, "civil union," ensued. Definitional debates have political, moral, and personal implications. What is poverty? Obesity? Adulthood? In 2007, the meaning of the term "surge" in reference to the United States military' action in Iraq was hotly contested. Was this an expansion of the war or simply provision of necessary resources to achieve existing objectives? The 2007 immigration reform offered the opportunity for illegal immigrants working in this country to achieve citizenship through a cumbersome and expensive process. The reform legislation failed in part because it was termed "amnesty" by its opponents. Likewise, the definition of "terrorism" creates significant problems in our foreign policy.

### A2 Havel

#### Your author would agree that its silly to insulate your arguments from policy comparison.

Jentleson 2002

Bruce W. Jentleson (Director of the Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy and Professor of Public Policy and Political Science at Duke University) spring 2002 International Security, Vol. 26, No. 4 pp. 169–183

Ultimately it is about an ethic, about what is valued, about how professional success and personal fulfillment are defined. **I am** again **reminded of a statement by Vaclav Havel,** this playwright turned political dissident turned leader of his country’s liberation from communism and move toward democratization, in his 1990 speech to a joint session of the U.S. Congress: “I am not the first, nor will I be the last, intellectual to do this. On the contrary, my feeling is that there will be more and more of them all the time. **If the hope of the world lies in human consciousness, then it is obvious that intellectuals cannot go on forever avoiding their share of responsibility for the world and hiding their distaste for politics under an alleged need to be independent. It is easy to have independence in your program and then leave others to carry that program out. If everyone thought that way, pretty soon no one would be independent.”**33 None of us is likely to have the role or responsibilities that Havel has. But **we too are intellectuals who must think deeply about what our roles are to be, amid the extraordinary times in which we live**.

### A2 Hicks and Greene

#### No link—hicks and greene are former policy debaters who used their experience to publish academic work—the fact that this happened at all is proof that switch-side debate does not automatically produce neoliberal subjects

#### Hicks and Greene are wrong—switch-side debate is good and any alternative links worse to their criticism of debate

Stannard 2006

(Matt, Department of Communication and Journalism, University of Wyoming, Spring 2006 Faculty Senate Speaker Series Speech, April 18, http://theunderview.blogspot.com/2006/04/deliberation-democracy-and-debate.html)

If it is indeed true that debate inevitably produces other-oriented deliberative discourse at the expense of students' confidence in their first-order convictions, this would indeed be a trade-off worth criticizing. In all fairness, Hicks and Greene do not overclaim their critique, and they take care to acknowledge the important ethical and cognitive virtues of deliberative debating. When represented as anything other than a political-ethical concern, however, **Hicks and Greene's critique has several problems**: First, as my colleague J.P. Lacy recently pointed out, **it seems a tremendous causal (or even rhetorical) stretch to go from "debating both sides of an issue creates civic responsibility essential to liberal democracy" to "this civic responsibility upholds the worst forms of American exceptionalism**." Second, **Hicks and Greene do not make any comparison of the potentially bad power of debate to any alternative. Their implied alternative, however, is a form of forensic speech that privileges personal conviction. The idea that students should be able to preserve their personal convictions at all costs seems far more immediately tyrannical, far more immediately damaging to either liberal or participatory democracy, than the ritualized requirements that students occasionally take the opposite side of what they believe**. Third, as I have suggested and will continue to suggest, while a debate project requiring participants to understand and often "speak for" opposing points of view may carry a great deal of liberal baggage, it is at its core a project more ethically deliberative than institutionally liberal. **Where Hicks and Greene see debate producing "the liberal citizen-subject," I see debate at least having the potential to produce "the deliberative human being." The fact that some academic debaters are recruited by the CSIS and the CIA does not undermine this thesis. Absent healthy debate programs, these think-tanks and government agencies would still recruit what they saw as the best and brightest students. And absent a debate community that rewards anti-institutional political rhetoric as much as liberal rhetoric, those students would have little-to-no chance of being exposed to truly oppositional ideas. Moreover, if we allow ourselves to believe that it is "culturally imperialist" to help other peoples build institutions of debate and deliberation, we not only ignore living political struggles that occur in every culture, but we fall victim to a dangerous ethnocentrism in holding that "they do not value deliberation like we do." If the argument is that our participation in fostering debate communities abroad greases the wheels of globalization, the correct response, in debate terminology, is that such globalization is non-unique, inevitable, and there is only a risk that collaborating across cultures in public debate and deliberation will foster resistance to domination—just as debate accomplishes wherever it goes**. Indeed, Andy Wallace, in a recent article, suggests that Islamic fundamentalism is a byproduct of the colonization of the lifeworld of the Middle East; if this is true, then one solution would be to foster cross-cultural deliberation among people on both sides of the cultural divide willing to question their own preconceptions of the social good. **Hicks and Greene might be correct insofar as elites in various cultures can either forbid or reappropriate deliberation, but for those outside of that institutional power, democratic discussion would have a positively subversive effect.**

### A2 Policy Education Bad

#### 1. We solve this—any reason why policy education is bad is more likely to be true of shallow, simple education that comes from high school civics classes or basic exposure to propaganda on the news—if the government is actually bad, in-depth education can only be good because it should expose these flaws

#### 2. Their framework is suicidal–it cedes the opportunity to influence state policy and gives power to the elite

Walt 1991

(Stephen, Professor at the University of Chicago, *International Studies Quarterly* 35)

A third reason for decline was the **Vietnam** War. Not only did the debacle in Indochina cast doubt on some of the early work in the field (such as the techniques of “systems analysis” and the application of bargaining theory to international conflict), it also **made the study of security affairs unfashionable in many universities**. The latter effect was both ironic and unfortunate, because the debate on the war was first and foremost a debate about basic security issues. Was the “domino theory” accurate? Was U.S. credibility really at stake? Would using military force in Indochina in fact make the U.S. more secure? **By neglecting the serious study of security affairs, opponents of the war could not effectively challenge the official rationales for U.S. involvement. The persistent belief that opponents of war should not study national security is like trying to find a cure for cancer by refusing to study medicine while allowing research on the disease to be conducted solely by tobacco companies.**

#### 3. Debating state policy allows us to shape institutions and resist domination

Stannard 2006

(Matt, Department of Communication and Journalism, University of Wyoming, Spring 2006 Faculty Senate Speaker Series Speech, April 18, <http://theunderview.blogspot.com/2006/04/deliberation-democracy-and-debate.html>)

**I would suggest debate programs, as safe deliberation zones, which can in turn inform liberatory politics.** Above all, a **commitment to deliberative democracy means removing the stigma from disagreement and confrontation** If Habermas is right, and I obviously believe he is, then **academics cannot afford to be insulated from the lives of ordinary working people**, but must instead co-participate in some kind of empowerment for all, perhaps by facilitating schools, and, and teaching all participants to be co-creators not only of the substance of debate, but the rulemaking of the conversational process itself. This debating can take place both inside and outside of schools. A commitment to deliberative democracy means a commitment to privileging the process of deliberation over other processes in shaping political life. In other words, inclusive rather than restrictive voting rights, more candidates on TV and not less, more resources committed to education not fewer, erring on the side of freedom of speech rather than restrictions, and above all, an emphasis on and respect for the conversational process itself as an active, inclusive, organic field of political truth-building. A democratization, in other words, of the building of collective truth. Sometimes this means conducting deliberative polls or favoring the referendum process. Other times it means making the political process more transparent, such as favoring open-door meetings and the like. Now, **many people make pretty good arguments as to the imperfections of these policies. The referendum process can be co-opted, bought out; sometimes even openness is antithetical to transparency, since cynical politicians can take advantage of openness for their own publicity, and sometimes people need to deliberate in private. But the great thing about deliberation as a commitment is that these criticisms can become part of the overall process of deliberative democracy. In a world where interested parties have the opportunity to speak and debate in good faith, we can criticize the referendum process, or explain why we can’t always have open meetings. We can debate the rules themselves, in other words, debate the process itself. All of this suggests that, if deliberative ethics are an antidote to both authoritarianism and self-centeredness, we need more: More debate teams, more public discussion, more patient deliberation, more argument, more discourse, and more nurturing and promotion of the material entities that sustain them.**

### A2 We Solve Education

#### Our education is better quality—

#### A. Topic specific—even if we both provide education, our Mitchell evidence is an impact for why the CONTENT of our education is better

#### B. Deep versus shallow—even if other approaches provide education, switch-side debate fosters deep-holistic learning

Schaap 2005

(Andrew, University of Melbourne, Politics, Vol 25 Iss 1, February)

According to an influential theory of teaching in higher education, **people** tend to **approach learning either in a 'deep-holistic' or 'surface-atomistic' way** (Ramsden, 1992, pp. 43ff.). **Students who adopt a deep-holistic approach to learning seek to discover the meaning of an idea**, text or concept **by relating new information to previous experience and the broader context** within which it is encountered. By contrast, **students who adopt a surface-atomistic approach tend to simply reproduce information, accumulating particular facts or details without discovering and constructing relations between them**. Ramsden (1992, pp. 53ff.) reports on research that shows that **deep-holistic approaches** to learning **are related to higher-quality outcomes and greater enjoyment while surface-atomistic approaches are dissatisfying** and associated with poorer grades. Ramsden (1992, pp. 96–102) identifies six key principles of teaching in higher education to promote a deep-holistic approach to learning. Effective teaching requires: engaging student interest; demonstrating concern and respect for students and student learning; providing appropriate feedback and assessment so that students can monitor their own learning; presenting students with clear goals and an intellectual challenge; giving students independence and control over their own learning; and modifying one's own teaching practice in response to student learning outcomes. In sum**, effective teaching encourages students to relate to the subject material in a purposeful way. Teaching methods that promote deep-holistic approaches to learning 'involve students in actively finding knowledge, interpreting results, and testing hypotheses against reality** (often in a spirit of co-operation as well as individual effort) as a route to understanding and the secure retention of factual knowledge' (Ramsden, 1992, p. 152). According to Ramsden there is no best teaching method. Nevertheless, some methods naturally encourage a deep-holistic approach to learning better than others. The traditional university lecture tends to be modelled on an implicit theory of teaching as transmitting information to students rather than one of making learning possible. While lectures can be engaging, stimulating and can involve students as active learners, this is often difficult to achieve and more often they encourage surface-atomistic approaches to learning: students struggle to remember various isolated details and the lecturer appears as a remote authority rather than participating in a community of learning with his or her students. Consequently, Ramsden (1992, p. 167) insists that the best way to improve the effectiveness of teaching in higher education is to make lecturing 'less like a lecture (passive, rigid, routine knowledge transmission) and more like an active communication between teacher and students'. **In contrast to lecturing, role playing naturally tends to promote a deep-holistic approach to learning because it requires students to interact and collaborate** in order to complete an assigned task. **The context of the role play requires students to adopt different perspectives and think reflexively about** the **information** they represent to the group. Some benefits of role playing identified by historian James Levy (1997, pp. 14–18) are **that it: helps overcome students' inhibitions to contribute because they feel that they do not know enough; stimulates student discussion and debate outside of the classroom**; provides many teachable moments by revealing gaps in students' understanding that the instructor can address; **encourages students to grapple with sophisticated issues that they might otherwise have failed to appreciate**; and often challenges the teacher's own views.

#### 3. Even if they win a certain subject matter should be included, our forum is key to effective inclusion of those ideas.

Gonzales 2008

(Angelo, Ph.D. Candidate, Travers Department of Political Science, University of California at Berkeley, “Teaching American Political Institutions Using Role Playing Simulations,” Feb 22, http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/2/4/5/6/3/pages245631/p245631-1.php)

**Role-playing simulations,** in particular**, are an excellent teaching technique from both a pedagogical and a substantive political science perspective**. On the pedagogical side, **role- playing simulations are a great way to reach students with all types of learning styles. The very nature of role-playing engages the strengths of tactile-kinesthetic learners, and, when designed correctly, such simulations can reach both auditory and visual learners, as well**. Additionally, as other researchers have demonstrated, **role-playing simulations can actually enhance students’ understanding and retention of course material, especially when designed around a well-defined and limited set of** learning **objectives** (Baranowski 2006; Frederking 2005; Lay and Smarick 2006). From a political science (American politics) perspective, **role-playing simulations provide a useful way for students to learn about both the process of the American political system and the dynamics of American political institutions** (Baranowski 2006; Ciliotta-Rubery and Levy 2000; Endersby and Webber 1995; Lay and Smarick 2006; Smith and Boyer 1996). As Smith and Boyer (1996, 690) argue, ―**Simulations have the power to recreate complex, dynamic political processes** in the classroom, **allowing students to examine the motivations, behavioral constraints, resources and interactions among institutional actors**.

### A2 Won’t Be Policy Makers

#### 1. Even if we never become policy makers, good understanding of government is important—as academics our theories about the state will be better, other people in debate might become policy makers, and role playing will make us better decision makers in general

#### 2. The fact that we may not become policymakers makes this education more important, not less

Keller Whittaker and Burke 2001

(Thomas E., James K., and Tracly K., Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago, professor of Social Work, and doctoral student School of Social Work, "Student debates in policy courses: promoting policy practice skills and knowledge through active learning," Journal of Social Work Education, Spr/Summer, EBSCOhost)

Experiential learning, in the form of the practicum placement, is a key element in social work education. However, **few** social work **students enroll in political or policy oriented practica**. In a survey of 161 CSWE-accredited programs (131 BSW, 30 MSW), Wolk and colleagues (1996) found that less than half offered practica in government relations (BSW=20%, MSW=47%) and even fewer had placements in policy advocacy/development (BSW=15%, MSW=33%). Moreover, programs typically reported only one or two students participating in these types of placements, with the largest representation at a single school being 9 out of 250 MSW students (Wolk et al., 1996). **Because few students receive policy-related field education, introducing students to policy relevant skills and experiences via active learning exercises** in the classroom **assumes greater importance.** Bonwell and Eison (1991) describe the general characteristics of active learning in the classroom: \* Students are involved in more than listening. \* Less emphasis is placed on transmitting information and more on developing students' skills. \* Students are involved in higher-order thinking (analysis, synthesis, evaluation). \* Students are engaged in activities. \* Greater emphasis is placed on students' exploration of their own attitudes and values. (p. 2) **Experiential learning** in the classroom **may involve** case studies, role plays, **debates**, simulations, or other activities **that allow students to make connections among theory, knowledge, and experience** (Lewis & Williams, 1994). **These active learning strategies encourage students to think on their feet, to question their own values and responses to situations, and to consider new ways of thinking in contexts which they may experience more intensely and, consequently, may remember longer** (Meyers & Jones, 1993).

### A2 You Endorse The State

#### 1. False—we don’t. We’re playing a game.

#### 2. Engaging the is uniquely radical and effective – a focus on method divorced from policy change only wins half the battle

Guilhot 2005

Nicolas Guilhot (research fellow – Social Science Research Council, prof sociology – LSE) 2005 The Democracy Makers, p. 185-186)

This last point regarding the internationalization of hegemonic kinds of knowledge and expertise in the wake of activist struggles for rights is an invitation to pay attention to the role of academics in the production and expansion of this new industry of human rights and democracy. Lawyers, obviously, but also political scientists produce an expertise that is increasingly invested in these transnational struggles through issue networks. They provide these new international actors not only with instruments, but also, as I have suggested, with legitimacy. **Linking up with struggles** which are highly rewarding in symbolic terms **allows scholars**, in turn, **to fight on a more local turf by using** these **external resources**: thus, the opposition of social constructivists with realists or neorealists, that of "transitologists" against modernization sociology or, more generically, that of political scientists against economists, are local conflicts waged by the proxy of more universal symbols. In writing about issue or advocacy networks, epistemic communities, and the power of ideas to influence policies, political scientists therefore have been theorizing practices in which they were increasingly involved. Human rights and democracy have been the twin issues around which a major transformation of policy research and advocacy took place in the 1980s: increasingly placing emphasis on values and ideals as compared to technical problem solving, this transformation has permitted the valorization of political commitment cum intellectual skills **beyond the campus perimeter**. An activist ethos acquired in the movements of the 1960s and 1970s became **progressively** **functional** to a new articulation between foreign policy goals and their transnational implementation. At the same time, the **administrative** and entrepreneurial **skills** which came to be associated with the conduct of academic research (e.g. Jacoby 1987) **were** qualities easily **reusable** in the wider context of value-oriented, principled expertise. The role of social and political scientists in the constitution of the techno-scientific skill base of issue networks is the concrete historical and social background against which the development of a scientific discourse on transnational activism and the idealist theories of policy change associated with it must be matched. I rati this perspective, it becomes possible to read the concepts and the logic informing theories about the political consequences of ideas as abstract redescriptions of an emerging academic activism. By substituting the logic of ideas with the logic of social practices, however, these theories also misrepresent their real object. An anonymous “power of ideas” is thus substituted for the socially determined power of professional idea brokers and committed academics. The methodological choice of taking ideas as “independent variables” further contributes to this misrepresentation by making it difficult to assign them to specific, socially located actors.

## A2 Impact Turns

### General Answer

#### Topical version of the aff solves all of their offense – [Explain]

#### Our arguments address the foundational layer of debate – this comes first

Saurette 2000

Paul Saurette, PhD Johns Hopkins, 2000 International Journal of Peace Studies 5:1

The problem of concepts -- what they are, where they are located, how we create/discover them -- has always been close to the heart of philosophy and extends deep into the sciences and social sciences.  Within IR, this concern has generally been located in the sphere of methodology and it remains crucial to the various behaviourist - positivist - empiricist - traditionalist debates.  All but the most stubborn empiricists accept that concepts influence our thinking, the validity of studies and the utility of certain perspectives. It is not surprising, then, that some of the most heated debates in the history of IR (and international law) have focused on the proper place, method and definition of certain key concepts such as sovereignty, war, human rights, anarchy, institutions, power, and international. If all concepts are equally created, however, some become represented and treated as more equal than others. There are, in fact, different layers of conceptual understanding and degrees of articulability and these render certain concepts more or less subject to question.[8](http://www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol5_1/saurette.htm#Notes#Notes) In any debate, certain understandings are shared by its participants and certain concepts must be common for communication to occur.  These concepts become the foundational layer of the debate, rarely being raised for consideration, but profoundly shaping the contours of the debate.  There have been two traditionally philosophical responses to this.  The first, more familiar to mainstream IR, might be seen as the empiricist and positivist response in which the importance of this layer is minimized and its concepts represented as 'preliminary assumptions', 'term variables', or 'operative definitions' -- voluntarily accepted concepts that are hypothetically and tentatively accepted for their heuristic value.  Because many empiricists and positivists accept an understanding of language and thought as transparent and instrumental, they generally assume that, with enough effort, all of our fundamental assumptions and concepts can be clarified and their consequences known -- allowing for, if not truthful representation, then at least useful manipulation.  While this has perhaps been the prevalent view within English philosophy since the scientific revolution, a second approach, what has been called the continental tradition of philosophy, has consistently challenged these premises.  From this perspective, Kant's definition of the project of philosophy as the search for the transcendental conditions of thought and morality is the paradigmatic challenge to the English tradition of empiricism. According to Kant (and shifting him into the language of this essay), there exist certain natural preconditions -- transcendental fields -- of thought that allow us to make sense of experience.  And while some of these necessary preconditions (categories and concepts) can be traced and categorized, others, such as the constitutive and regulative Ideas, cannot be known with the same theoretical rigor.  On this view, the concepts (Ideas) of this deep layer of shared understandings (experience) are not  transparent and available to examination.  Even those we can represent cannot be manipulated and reconfigured.  Far from being heuristic devices of our own making, they are the necessary and universal conditions of possibility for any experience and understanding.

### A2 America Bad/Spanos

#### 1. this is not a reason role playing is bad—even if the united states does evil things, we should still learn how the system works so we can oppose it

#### 2. Even if the American government is bad, role playing doesn’t associate us with it—we can examine courses of action without endorsing the agent, the same way that historians do when they write counterfactuals about Germany in world war two or actors do when they play a part

#### Switch side debate solves any risk of debate being unethical – their arguments are based in a lack of understanding of the activity and how it works to shape students.

Abbott 2009

(Blake, Debate Coach at the University of Georgia and B.A. in Political Science at Mercer University and M.A. from Wake Forest University, “The Project and Switch Side Debate”, November 11th, http://www.georgiadebate.org/2009/11/the-project-and-switch-side-debate)

**In debates that take place between policy teams and project teams, one central sticking point tends to be over the merits of switch side debate in our activity**. Proponents of switch side debate argue that doing so offers debaters an opportunity to take a new perspective by learning and advocating a position they might not agree with within a given debate round. Doing so enhances critical thinking skills and teaches debaters to become better advocates for the things they do believe because they have examined all sides of the argument. **Opponents argue that switch side debate is basically modern day sophistry, leading to an “anything goes” approach to argumentation that has no ethical foundation**. Lack of such foundation leads to rounds where debaters advocate nuclear wars, extinction, and even racism or genocide. **I think the major drawback in debates on this particular issue is that they tend to lack real clash**. One side says switch side debating is educational, and the other says it’s unethical. No one resolves these two impacts. Well, **I will attempt to provide some** (contingent, I’m sure) **way to resolve this discussion**, and I’ll start out by stating my advocacy: **project teams should be more willing to engage in switch side debate**. In my previous post, I argued that project teams should engage the current debate topic, and I still think avoiding the topic is a big missed opportunity. Here, though, project teams take a very one-size-fits-all approach to switch side debate that misses the chances to explore numerous aspects of their own arguments and strategic goals. I am convinced that the topic presents less of a hindrance and more of an opportunity for project teams to find links to the things they want to say**. I’ve heard some arguments/questions that I have heard some project teams make, and I’ve been frankly shocked at how poor the answers to these questions has been**. I’ll address a couple here. **The first one is a subset of the “switch side debate is unethical” argument, and it goes something like this: “Are you saying that on a slavery topic, we would have to advocate slavery good?”** First, I take issue with the question. **Switch side debating isn’t just taking both sides of any good/bad debate. There’s more to it than that, especially since sometimes there are more than 2 sides to an issue**. Second, **this is an extreme example, but** even if I grant the premise of the question, I would say that **you should be willing to examine that argument and advocate it in the space of a debate. That doesn’t mean that you take on that belief; it does mean that you don’t close off an argument just because you don’t agree**. The debate round should be a space to test out arguments, and **part of the education one gets from that testing is the experience of advocating something unfamiliar, and even oppositional to your beliefs. Plus, you can better argue against the offending argument if you have tried it on in an environment that encourages you to learn how it works**. Ultimately, I dispute the slippery slope in the premise of this argument, though. **Maybe you wouldn’t**, as a matter of conscience, **be willing to go as far as say “slavery good,” but on this year’s topic, you should be willing to argue that either we should reduce our nuclear weapons or we shouldn’t**. You can support your claim with reasons based in your project, **but the fact that the potential exists advocate bad things in a debate round isn’t by itself a sufficient reason to refuse switch side debate**. I'm sure many people arguments they may not be willing to make for their own reasons, but that fact alone is not a condemnation of switch side debating. **Another argument I hear is the use of a paragraph from** William **Spanos** in the book “Cross-X” in which **he argues that debate’s potential for “‘disinterested’ argumentative skills” becomes a training ground for neoconservative ideology**. It is important to **note that Spanos’ understanding of debate is marginal at best, but** more importantly**, even if he’s right that debate can produce neocons, that’s not the only outcome. It can, and has, also produced strong advocates for anti-neocon causes. For example, Neal Katyal**, the attorney who successfully argued Hamdan v. Rumsfeld in the Supreme Court, was a debater. Also, I would quibble with the terminology of “disinterested” argumentation that Spanos uses and project teams pick up on**. Just because I argue for something institutional in nature in a debate round doesn’t mean that I’m taking a disinterested view. In fact, the process of arguing unfamiliar points is a really good way for me to become interested and gain a personal connection to the arguments that I make in rounds, even if that personal connection isn’t the same as ones that project teams discuss**. Believe me, I could just as easily go off on policy teams for not really switching sides on many big arguments (with the exception of the occasional impact turn debate, we pretty much presume that hegemony is good and nuclear war is bad, regardless of side). My basic point here is **that project teams do themselves a disservice by closing off new ways to approach argumentation that are allowed by switch side debate**. We don’t have to take a full-tilt, anything goes approach, but don’t throw it all out either. Even if some potential for abuse exists, it’s a risk worth taking.

#### Criticizing the government only isolates the left—brutal American history is a reason to engage the state, not reject it

Gitlin 2005

(Todd, professor of journalism and sociology at Columbia University, The Intellectuals and Patriotism, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/git01/)

**From the late New Left point of view**, then, **patriotism meant obscuring the whole grisly truth of the United States. It couldn’t help spilling over into** what Orwell thought was the harsh, dangerous, and distinct phenomenon of **nationalism**, with its aggressive edge and its implication of superiority. Scrub up patriotism as you will, and nationalism, as Schaar put it, remained “patriotism’s bloody brother.” Was Orwell’s distinction not, in the end, a distinction without a difference? Didn’t his patriotism, while refusing aggressiveness, still insist that the nation he affirmed was “the best in the world”? What if there was more than one feature of the American way of life that you did not believe to be “the best in the world”—the national bravado, the overreach of the marketplace. Patriotism might well be the door through which you marched with the rest of the conformists to the beat of the national anthem. Facing these realities, **all the left could do was criticize empire** and, on the positive side, unearth and cultivate righteous traditions. The much-mocked “political correctness” of the next academic generations was a consolation prize. We might have lost politics but we won a lot of the textbooks. **The tragedy of the left is that**, having achieved an unprecedented victory in helping stop an appalling war, **it** then **proceeded to commit suicide. The left helped force the United States out of Vietnam**, where the country had no constructive work to do—either for Vietnam or for itself—**but did so at the cost of disconnecting itself from the nation. Most U.S. intellectuals substituted the pleasures of condemnation for the pursuit of improvement. The orthodoxy was that “the system” precluded reform—never mind that the antiwar movement had already demonstrated that reform was possible**. Human rights, feminism, environmental- ism—these worldwide initiatives, American in their inception, flowing not from the American Establishment but from our own American movements, were noises off, not center stage. They were outsider tastes, the stuff of protest, not national features, the real stuff. Thus when, in the nineties, the Clinton administration finally mobilized armed force in behalf of Bosnia and then Kosovo against Milosevic’s genocidal Serbia, the hard left only could smell imperial motives, maintaining that democratic, anti-genocidal intentions added up to a paper-thin mask. In short**, if the United States seemed fundamentally trapped in militarist imperialism, its opposition was trapped in the mirror-image opposite. By the seventies the outsider stance had be-come second nature**. Even those who had entered the sixties in diapers came to maturity thinking patriotism a threat or a bad joke. **But anti-Americanism** was, and remains, a mood and a metaphysics more than a politics. It **cannot help but see practical politics as an illusion, entangled as it is and must be with a sys-tem fatally flawed by original sin. Viewing the ongoing politics of the Americans as contemptibly shallow and compromised, the demonological attitude naturally rules out patriotic attachment to those very Americans**. Marooned (often **self-marooned) on university campuses, exiled in left-wing media and other cultural outposts—all told, an archipelago of bitterness—what sealed it- self off in the postsixties decades was** what Richard Rorty has called “**a spectatorial, disgusted, mocking Left rather than a Left which dreams of achieving our country.”**

### A2 Butler

#### Framework is an exception –even Butler concedes some exclusion is necessary to open up critical reflection that ensures survival

Dean 2005

(Jodi, Associate Professor – Political Theory, The Hedgehog Review, 6-22, Lexis)

**Butler does not always and necessarily avoid condemnation**. In fact, important to my argument is the fact **that her ethics need not preclude condemnation** **and** that it can and **should be sharpened** so as **to account for** such divisive, **political moments**. Yet it is striking to me that when Butler does condemn, it is as if she finds herself in that moment trapped within a discourse she rejects, to which she can only gain access through a condemnation. Thus, in Precarious Life, she condemns "on several bases the violence done against the United States and do[es] not see it as 'just punishment' for prior sins." (9) In her analysis of U.S. policies of indefinite detention in Guantanamo Bay, U.S. violence against Afghanistan, the U.S.'s "shock and awe" attackson Iraq, and the Bush administration's hegemonization of political discourse after September 11th in terms of its own position as victim,however, she does not condemn. Rather, she analyzes, explains, contextualizes, interprets, interrogates, and, in so doing, critiques. Forme this raises the question of Butler's separation of condemnation and critique and the political place and function of each. **Butler presumes that condemnation involves closure**. That is, **she treats condemnation as unlike other speech acts, as if condemnation were an act of sovereignty** already **bent on effacing** its own supporting conditions, its own **vulnerability** and dependence. So even as she recognizes judging as a mode of address and thus premised on the context of address that "can and should provide a sustaining condition of ethical deliberation, judgment, and conduct," **she reads condemnation as** essentially **an act of violence**, one **that** "erodes the capacity of the addressed subject for both self-reflection and social-recognition" and **works to "paralyze and deratify** the **critical capacities** of the subject to whom it is addressed" (37). If the condemned is already positioned in a prior relation of subordination, such erosion and paralysis may result. **But not necessarily. The condemned may reject the** bases, the terms, of **condemnation**--"I am not who you say I am" or "Because I am who you say I am, you are the one who ultimately suffers, who is left shattered and bereft in condemning me." The condemned may also accept the words of the condemnation but challenge the suppositions supporting these words, the suppositions that give it an ethical valence beyond a mere statement of fact--"Yes, I am a godless communist, so?" Condemnation, in other words, may not succeed. **Its effects** on the addressee as well as its relation to other acts and interpretations **cannot be determined in advance**. Likewise, if the condemned is in fact more powerful--the President of a mighty military power, say--then **associating condemnation with paralysis** and deratification **surely overstates the power** of the address. One could wish that condemnation had such effects, and with respect to Bush's unconscionable, immoral, unjustified, illegal, and imperialist war against Iraq, I certainly do. Bush's persistence in his preemptive war against Iraq in the face of the condemnation of millions throughout the world, however, points to the weakness and inefficacy of condemnation unbacked by force. In sum, condemnation is not as powerful and efficacious as Butler implies. And, insofar as it occurs within a context of address, **condemnation is citational, relying** for its efficacy **on a set of prior norms that it reiterates, a set of prior practices and values to which it connects. Condemnation** does not occur ex nihilo but **is based on** something, **something shared**. As with other utterances, condemnation is "uncontrollable, appropriable, and able to signify otherwise and in excess of its animating intentions." (10) **To condemn, then, is to appeal to a prior set of connections at its basis and** **thereby to open up this basis for investigation, critique, and**, **potentially**, **condemnation**.

### A2 Kulynych

#### Goes neg in this context

Kulynych 1997

Jessica Kulynych, Asst Professor of Political Science at Winthrop University, Polity, Winter, 1997, n2 p315(32)

When we look at the success of citizen initiatives from a performative perspective, we look precisely at those moments of defiance and disruption that bring the invisible and unimaginable into view. Although citizens were minimally successful in influencing or controlling the outcome of the policy debate and experienced a considerable lack of autonomy in their coercion into the technical debate, the goal-oriented debate within the energy commissions could be seen as a defiant moment of performative politics. The existence of a goal-oriented debate within a technically dominated arena defied the normalizing separation between expert policymakers and consuming citizens. Citizens momentarily recreated themselves as policymakers in a system that defined citizens out of the policy process, thereby refusing their construction as passive clients.

### A2 Schlag

#### Normative debate is valuable for its own sake—we can still win because these are interesting questions to discuss. They link to the impact more by over-determining what we think is at stake in each round

West 2009

(Robin West, Frederick J. Haas Professor of Law and Philosophy, Associate Dean for Research and Academic Programs, Georgetown Law, “Reply to Pierre,” 2009, Vol. 97:865. THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL, <http://georgetownlawjournal.org/files/pdf/97-3/West.PDF>)

Why? What’s wrong with normativity? Pierre has given various answers in his twenty-year critique of normativity, but this new essay suggests yet an additional argument, which I think is wrong and merits a response. One reason for Pierre’s longstanding opposition to normativity, suggested by this essay, might be a suspicion—well-grounded—that the kind of normative questions asked, and certainly the answers given by MLS, will be, or are, or have always been in the past, imitative of the sorts of normative questions judges ask when deciding cases. Just as the truths about the world and the statements of law in MLS are basically imitative of judicial declarations of truth and law, so too are the political or moral claims about the way the world should look. And, for the same reasons, the normative questions that judges ask and the answers they give, as well as the empirical and legal questions they ask in the course of writing judicial opinions, will be—virtually by definition they must be— politically uninteresting, aesthetically unappealing, and intellectually deadening. And **scholars imitate judges. So, mainstream normative jurisprudence is likewise politically uninteresting, aesthetically unappealing, and so on**. As such, the problem with mainstream normative legal scholarship—MNLS—is that the normative questions it asks—what should the law be, what should the world look like, how might law contribute—imitate the normative questions asked by judges. Those latter questions, in turn, will be “truncated,” to use Unger’s term for the same phenomenon,12 or spam, to revert to Pierre’s. Spam normative questions about what the law and world should look like will invite spam answers. But if that’s the argument, there’s a pretty obvious problem with it, which Pierre’s essay itself clearly shows. **Here’s the problem. Pierre may be right abou**t the **nature of normative questions posed and answered** by judges. As virtually everyone who’s thought about it agrees**, both judges and the schola**rs that imitate them, **when explaining** what **the law** is, **have to** also e**xplain what the law should be. If we want to explain “the law” of compensation for injuries caused by badly manufactured products, we’re going to have to** also say **what we think “the law” ought to be**, because “what it is” is just not all that clear. So, **there’s some “normative” or “political” or “moral” analysis involved in even the most ordinary legal and adjudicative writing**. Statements of “what the law is” will indeed include, perforce, a tad of “policy analysis,” a dabbling in costs and benefits, some philosophizing over fundamental values or basic principles, and at least some “weighing” of pros and cons between proffered alternatives. That dabbling will be spam-like, for the same reasons the judge’s various truth claims and statements of what the law is are such. And this is as true of imitative legal scholarship as it is of judicial opinion writing itself. The conclusion thus follows: if legal scholarship is spam, then so is its normative component. **My objection to this Schlagian syllogism is just this: normative legal scholarship does not have to be so confined, and if anyone pays attention to Pierre’s essay, it won’t be. It doesn’t have to be imitative. It doesn’t have to be adjudication-lite**. Legal scholars could ask, and I think should ask, **normative questions about** what **the law should be**, not so as to get a better grip on what the law is, and not so as to better imitate the cost-benefit policy analysis or the fundamental values analysis or the basic principles analysis or the pros-andcons reasoning that typifies adjudication; not, in brief, so as **to better sway the court toward one possible legal result over another**. Legal scholars could and I think should be asking what the law should be, and what it should not be; what our social world should look like, and what it should not look like; what of the law we have is an utter disaster, and what of the law we don’t have that we perhaps should have. **And we could do all of this “normative analysis” not toward the end of figuring out what the law is—that is indeed what truncates or spamifies normative analysis13—but solely because these are important questions to ask.**

### A2 Sexton

#### Sexton mischaracterizes the social relations that they use for their impact claims

Spickard 2009

(Paul, UC, Santa Barbara, Amalgamation Schemes: Antiblackness and the Critique of Multiracialism (review) American Studies - Volume 50, Number 1/2, Spring/Summer 2009, pp. 125-127)

One of the major developments in ethnic studies over the past two decades has been the idea (and sometimes the advocacy) of multiraciality. From a theoretical perspective, this has stemmed from a post-structuralist attempt to deconstruct the categories created by the European Enlightenment and its colonial enterprise around the world. From a personal perspective, it has been driven by the life experiences in the last half-century of a growing number of people who have and acknowledge mixed parentage. The leading figures in this scholarly movement are probably Maria Root and G. Reginald Daniel, but the writers are many and include figures as eminent as Gary Nash and Randall Kennedy. A small but dedicated group of writers has resisted this trend: chiefly Rainier Spencer, Jon Michael Spencer, and Lewis Gordon. They have raised no controversy, perhaps [End Page 125] because their books are not well written, and perhaps because their arguments do not make a great deal of sense. It is not that there is nothing wrong with the literature and the people movement surrounding multiraciality. Some writers and social activists do tend to wax rhapsodic about the glories of intermarriage and multiracial identity as social panacea. A couple of not-very-thoughtful activists (Charles Byrd and Susan Graham) have been coopted by the Gingrichian right (to be fair, one must point out that most multiracialists are on the left). And, most importantly, there is a tension between some Black intellectuals and the multiracial idea over the lingering fear that, for some people, adopting a multiracial identity is a dodge to avoid being Black. If so, that might tend to sap the strength of a monoracially-defined movement for Black community empowerment. With Amalgamation Schemes, Jared Sexton is trying to stir up some controversy. He presents a facile, sophisticated, and theoretically informed intelligence, and he picks a fight from the start. His title suggests that the study of multiraciality is some kind of plot, or at the very least an illegitimate enterprise. His tone is angry and accusatory on every page. It is difficult to get to the grounds of his argument, because the cloud of invective is so thick, and because his writing is abstract, referential, and at key points vague. For Sexton (as for the Spencers and Gordon) race is about Blackness, in the United States and around the world. That is silly, for there are other racialized relationships. In the U.S., native peoples were racialized by European intruders in all the ways that Africans were, and more: they were nearly extinguished. To take just one example from many around the world, Han Chinese have racialized Tibetans historically in all the ways (including slavery) that Whites have racialized Blacks and Indians in the United States. So there is a problem with Sexton's concept of race as Blackness. There is also a problem with his insistence on monoraciality. For Sexton and the others, one cannot be mixed or multiple; one must choose ever and only to be Black. I don't have a problem with that as a political choice, but to insist that it is the only possibility flies in the face of a great deal of human experience, and it ignores the history of how modern racial ideas emerged. Sexton does point out, as do many writers, the flawed tendencies in multiracial advocacy mentioned in the second paragraph above. But he imputes them to the whole movement and to the subject of study, and that is not a fair assessment. The main problem is that Sexton argues from conclusion to evidence, rather than the other way around. That is, he begins with the conclusion that the multiracial idea is bad, retrograde, and must be resisted. And then he cherry-picks his evidence to fit his conclusion. He spends much of his time on weaker writers such as Gregory Stephens and Stephen Talty who have been tangential to the multiracial literature. When he addresses stronger figures like Daniel, Root, Nash, and Kennedy, he carefully selects his quotes to fit his argument, and misrepresents their positions by doing so. Sexton also makes some pretty outrageous claims. He takes the fact that people who study multiracial identities are often studying aspects of family life (such as the shaping of a child's identity), and twists that to charge them with homophobia and nuclear family-ism. That is simply not accurate for any of the main writers in the field. The same is true for his argument by innuendo that scholars of multiraciality somehow advocate mail-order bride services. And sometimes Sexton simply resorts to ad hominem attacks on the motives and personal lives of the writers themselves. It is a pretty tawdry exercise. That is unfortunate, because Sexton appears bright and might have written a much better book detailing his hesitations about some tendencies in the multiracial movement. He might even have opened up a new direction for productive study of racial commitment amid complexity. Sexton does make several observations that are worth thinking about, [End Page 126] and surely this intellectual movement, like any other, needs to think critically about itself. Sadly, this is not that book.

### A2 Social Location

#### 1. Our interpretation solves this—the aff can make arguments from their own social location, they just have to be justifications for government action—also, they can make arguments on the opposite side when they’re negative—they have to win both that there is no defense of government action from their social location, and that EVERY debate should ALWAYS be about their own social location

#### 2. Turn— privileging identity crushes debate

Stannard 2006

(Matt, Department of Communication and Journalism, University of Wyoming, Spring 2006 Faculty Senate Speaker Series Speech, April 18,

http://theunderview.blogspot.com/2006/04/deliberation-democracy-and-debate.html)

But the Academy is not only under attack from "outsiders," and not merely because the post-September 11 world has given the nod to sterile and commodified forms of patriotic communication and safe, symbolic dissent**. Both inside and outside college life, the value of discussion is increasingly under attack**, under sabotage, sometimes unintentionally, sometimes violently, and the attackers are often not recognizable as such. We cower away from religious fanatics because we know they refuse to entertain the possibility of their incorrectness, but **we fail to see our own failure to embrace the possibilities of our own incorrectness. We label other points of view "ideological" from vantage points we assume to be free of ideology, or we excuse our narrow-mindedness by telling ourselves that "ideology is inevitable." Part of this weakening of our commitment to open debate is our recent, seemingly liberating embrace of personal conviction over public deliberation, the self-comfort of personal narrative over the clumsy, awkward, and fallible attempt to forge consensus across the lines of identity and politics. The fetishization of personal conviction is no less threatening to the public forum than violent authoritarianism—both seek to render disagreement impossible, close off deliberation, and take us closer towards eventual, unnatural silence.**

### A2 Whiteness

#### The state can be a force for inclusion, not exclusion. Failure to engage the nation-state political framework guarantees that only the negative portions of the state are used. And identity politics creates an immigration policy based on exclusion, rather than acceptance.

Flood 1997

(Christopher Flood, University of Surrey, “Pierre-André Taguieff and the Dilemmas of Antiracism”, L'Esprit Createur, Volume 37, Number 2, Summer 1997, pp. 68-78, muse)

Taguieff is an old-fashioned nationalist of the left-republican variety. In his eyes, **only the nation-state breaks through the dialectic of globalization versus indefinite ethno-religious subdivision of societies. The Republic must therefore reclaim the idea of the nation which has been hijacked by the radical right and abandoned by the European-integrationist, globalist, multi-culturalist left**. Despite the widespread sense of national decline since the loss of the colonial empire, Taguieff sees plentiful evidence of the survival of French national identity and of the desire to resist the effects of global homogenization. He argues that French identity for many people still means the Republic and the myth of the Revolution as builder of a strong, centralized state which forged the unity of the nation. The objective can be summed up as "Ie social avec le national contre le nationalisme xÃ©nophobe et antisocial du Front national" (RÃ©publique, 59). The republican nation-state is the sole basis for justice under the law. Thus, the answer is: "RedÃ©finir et surtout rÃ©affirmer clairement la lÃ©gitimitÃ© du cadre national Ã la rÃ©publicaine, replacer l'idÃ©al de la laÃ¯citÃ© au cÂoeur du civisme, faire enfin de la citoyennetÃ© franÃ§aise un motif de fiertÃ©" (RÃ©publique, 56). However, **he emphasizes that the ideal of the Republic was to be open to the world, universalistic and non-exclusive. It does not entail a narrow, xenophobic conception of citizenship. It does not approach immigration from a position of suspicion of foreigners. It means integration, not expulsion.** But it is hostile to cultural communitarianism where groups draw in on themselves around their differences. **Immigrants must have the courage to assimilate by undergoing rites of passage**, including learning the French language and accepting French culture. Minority cultures should be practised in the private sphere but not in the public.

#### Only a pragmatic focus on changing practices can unite intersectional opposition to oppression

Winant 2006

(Howard, Temple University, "Race and Racism: Towards a Global Future." Ethnic and Racial Studies. Vol. 29, no. 5 (September 2006), pp. 986-1003. <http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/routledge/01419870.html>)

Race/Gender/Class: Race/gender/class ‘intersectionality’ (Crenshaw 1994; Collins 1998) is the name we now give to the complex of deep attachments and conflicts among anti-racist/anticolonial movements, women’s movements, and labour-based/anti-poverty movements. In the US (Lerner, 1972; Davis 1981; Zinn and Dill, 1994; Hine, 2005), in Britain (Rowbotham 1992; Ware 1992; McClintock 1995), France (Guillaumin 1995), and elsewhere these linkages have connected struggles for racial justice, women’s rights, and labour rights for nearly two centuries. Today these intersections cross the whole racial spectrum. In postcoloniality approaches, notably in the ‘subaltern studies’ school, feminism has come to play a central role (Spivak 1987), not only in relation to colonial and postcolonial South Asia, but in regard to Latin America (Beverley 1999; Franco 2001) and Africa (Urdang 1989; Seidman 1993; Amadiume 2000). The explanatory framework for intersectionality studies, however, remains elusive. **Unquestionably a general parallel exists between racial and gender-based oppressions and emancipatory claims**. De Beauvoir explicitly modelled her pioneering account in feminist theory, The Second Sex (1989 [1953]) on working-class and anticolonial struggles for emancipation. The key parallels she stressed, along with many others, included: rule through chattelization, the assignment of political status based on corporeal characteristics, ‘isolation effects’ and alienation, and the internalization of domination. **Numerous other common experiences link these axes of power and resistance. Yet racebased, gender-based, and labour-based movements have always teetered between convergence and divergence, both in the US and elsewhere. That’s at the macro-social, institutional level. At the micro-social or experiential level a similar uncertainty operates: involvement in ‘multiple oppressions’**, for example, often forces women of colour to ‘choose their battles’. They confront competing demands for solidarity, often across race-,class-,or genderlines. White women, too, must often choose between gender, race, and class solidarity. **Rather than lamenting these dilemmas, we should learn from them about pragmatism and the instability in practice of the race-concept. Theorizing intersectionality requires a hefty dose of pragmatism, a strong recognition that ‘self-reflective action’ shapes the production and transformation of both individual and collective identities.**7 This phenomenon \_ of situatedness and strategic reflection in practice \_ is not necessarily problematic for emancipatory purposes; it may indeed be unavoidable, a prerequisite, for all efforts (men’s as well as women’s) to create an emancipatory political framework.

### A2 Wise

#### Tim Wise is inaccurate – profit motive, and desire to make people feel safe, prevents interrogation from people of color

Martin 2010

Renee, pacifist, anti-racist, blogger on Womanist Musings The Limitations of Tim Wise, Womanist Musings, http://www.womanist-musings.com/2010/11/limitations-of-tim-wise.html, November 29, 2010)

Wise also has a tendency to reduce race relations to a Black/White binary. To be of colour in the U.S. is to be not White of non European descent. With the exception of a small passage on the fallacies in Disney's Pocahontas, Wise mainly framed racism as something Whites do to Blacks, rather than Whiteness as an institution that is harmful to every single person of colour. This is erasure and it ignores the hierarchies of power that support Whiteness, as well as ensures that people of colour are constantly fixated on each other, rather than united to bring an end to White supremacy. Social justice is hard work and it demands a full-time commitment and therefore, I completely understand when someone attempts to earn a living, even as they raise awareness to the multiple issues that plague our planet. It is highly problematic that a White man is earning a substantial living talking about the way that race effects people of colour. Wise of course covers this by discussing Whiteness, but the truth of the matter is, that you cannot talk about Whiteness without examining people of colour. He is essentially profiting from hundred of years of our history and taking on an expert status that is denied people of colour when we discuss our lived experiences. His very existence as White, educated male of class, TAB, cisgender, heterosexual privilege, means that he is affirming much of the very narrative that he seeks deconstruct. Wise makes White people feel safe. He gives them the appropriate liberal spin that never expects them to seek truth via the people most impacted by race. Each chapter of his book began with a James Baldwin quote, proving that people of colour exist for the purposes of appropriation, but never really to interact with, unless one is in a leadership role. One of the main problems with Wise's work is that it does not encourage those researching anti-racism to seek out the opinions of people of colour, thus once again turning Whiteness into the arbitrator. This normalizes oppression and further supports White supremacy. Wise does encourage readers to take on a subordinate role, but how believable is that when he continually fails to do so himself. Wise claims that it is his right to be forthright about race because he is fighting to end White supremacy,which he sees as harmful, not only to himself but to all people, but using the operating status of Whiteness to fight the battle cannot possibly disarm, much less eradicate this sickness. In the end, I think that Wise is very well aware that what he has to say has already been said and in fact argued infinitely better by people of colour. To really challenge privilege, one must first learn from the people that it impacts the most. Depending on Tim Wise to teach you about race means that you are not ready to move out of your comfort zone and really see racism for the pure evil that it is.

# Ethics

## Util Good

### Frontline

#### Inherent equality of all beings requires utilitiarianism

Cummiskey 1996

(David, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Bates College and Ph.D. from UM, “Kantian Consequentialism”, p. 145-146)

In the next section, I will defend this interpretation of the duty of beneficence. For the sake of argument, however, let us first simply assume that beneficence does not require significant self-sacrifice and see what follows. Although Kant is unclear on this point, we will assume that significant self-sacrifices are supererogatory.[11](http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/private/content/philosophy/0195094530/p046.html?en=acprof-0195094530-note-183" \l "acprof-0195094530-note-183) Thus, if I must harm one in order to save many, the individual whom I will harm by my action is not morally required to affirm the action. On the other hand, I have a duty to do all that I can for those in need. As a consequence I am faced with a dilemma: If I act, I harm a person in a way that a rational being need not consent to; if I fail to act, then I do not do my duty to those in need and thereby fail to promote an objective end. Faced with such a choice, which horn of the dilemma is more consistent with the formula of the end-in-itself? We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract "social entity." **It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive "overall social good."** Instead**, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons**. Robert Nozick, for example, argues that "to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has."[12](http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/private/content/philosophy/0195094530/p047.html?en=acprof-0195094530-note-184" \l "acprof-0195094530-note-184) But why is this not equally true of all those whom we do not save through our failure to act? **By emphasizing** solely **the one who must bear the cost if we act, we fail to** sufficiently **respect** and take account of **the** many **other** separate **persons**, each with only one life, **who will bear the cost of** our **inaction**. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? A morally good agent recognizes that the basis of all particular duties is the principle that "rational nature exists as an end in itself" (GMM 429). Rational nature as such is the supreme objective end of all conduct. **If** one truly believes that **all rational beings have an equal value, then the rational solution** to such a dilemma **involves maximally promoting the lives and liberties of as many** rational beings **as possible** (chapter [5](http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/private/content/philosophy/0195094530/p033.html#acprof-0195094530-chapter-5)). In order to avoid this conclusion**, the non-consequentialist** Kantian **needs to justify agent-centered constraints**. As we saw in chapter [1](http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/private/content/philosophy/0195094530/p017.html#acprof-0195094530-chapter-1), however, even most Kantian deontologists recognize that agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale. But we have seen that Kant's normative theory is based on an unconditionally valuable end. How can a concern for the value of rational beings lead to a refusal to sacrifice rational beings even when this would prevent other more extensive losses of rational beings? If the moral law is based on the value of rational beings and their ends, then what is the rationale for prohibiting a moral agent from maximally promoting these two tiers of value? If I **sacrifice** some **for the sake of others, I do not use them arbitrarily, and I do not deny the** unconditional **value of rational beings**. Persons may have "dignity, that is, an unconditional and incomparable worth" that transcends any market value (GMM 436), but **persons also have a fundamental equality that dictates that some must sometimes give way for the sake of others** (chapters [5](http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/private/content/philosophy/0195094530/p033.html" \l "acprof-0195094530-chapter-5) and [7](http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/private/content/philosophy/0195094530/p041.html" \l "acprof-0195094530-chapter-7)). **The concept of the end-in-itself does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others**. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration suggests that **one may have to sacrifice some to save many.**

#### Privileging ethics over political consequences dooms the affirmative to political irrelevance

**Isaac, 02** (Jeffrey, Professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University, Dissent, “Ends, Means, and Politics”, Spring, ebsco)

Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To ac- complish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond moral- ity. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, re- flecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suf- fers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Ab- juring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean con- science of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of **complicity in injustice.** This is why, from the standpoint of poli- tics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically re- pudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any ef- fect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pur- suit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and histori- cally contextualized ways. Moral absolutism in- hibits this judgment. It **alienates those who are not true believers**. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

### AT: Calc Bad

#### Calculation is good, the only question is whether you use calculations to save the other, which we do. Their ethic only leads to cooptation.

Jacques Derrida, Directeur d’Etudes at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris, and Professor of Philosophy, French and Comparative Literature at the University of California, Irvine, 2002, Acts of Religion, p. 255-57

This excess of justice over law and calculation, this overflowing of the unpre­sentable over the determinable, cannot and should not [ne peut pas et ne doit pas] serve as an alibi for staying out of juridico-political battles, within an institution or a state, between institutions or states. Abandoned to itself, the incalculable and giv­ing [donatrice] idea of justice is always very close to the bad, even to the worst for it can always be reappropriated by the most perverse calculation. It is always possible, and this is part of the madness of which we were speaking. An absolute assurance against this risk can only saturate or suture the opening of the call to justice, a call that is always wounded. But incalculable justice commands calculation. And first of all, closest to what one associates with justice, namely, law, the juridical field that one cannot isolate within sure frontiers, but also in all the fields from which one cannot separate it, which intervene in it and are no longer simply fields: the ethical, the political, the economical, the psycho-sociological, the philosophical, the liter­ary, etc. Not only must one [il faut] calculate, negotiate the relation between the calculable and the incalculable, and negotiate without a rule that would not have to be reinvented there where we are “thrown’ there where we find ourselves; but one must [il faut] do so and take it as far as possible, beyond the place we find our­selves and beyond the already identifiable zones of morality, politics, or law, beyond the distinctions between national and international, public and private, and so on. The order of this il faut does not properly belong either to justice or to law. It only belongs to either realm by exceeding each one in the direction of the other—which means that, in their very heterogeneity, these two orders are undis­sociable: de facto and de jure [en fait et en droit]. Politicization, for example, is interminable even if it cannot and should not ever be total. To keep this from being a truism, or a triviality, one must recognize in it the following consequence: each advance in politicization obliges one to reconsider, and so to reinterpret the very foundations of law such as they had previously been calculated or delimited. This was true for example in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, in the abolition of slavery, in all the emancipatory battles that remain and will have to remain in progress, everywhere in the world, for men and for women. Nothing seems to me less outdated than the classical emancipatory ideal. One cannot attempt to disqualify it today, whether crudely or with sophistication, without at least some thoughtlessness and without forming the worst complicities. It is true that it is also necessary to re-elaborate, without renouncing, the concept of eman­cipation, enfranchisement, or liberation while taking into account the strange structures we have been describing. But beyond these identified territories of juridico-politicization on the grand geo-political scale, beyond all self-serving misappropriations and hijackings, beyond all determined and particular reappropria­tions of international law, other areas must constantly open up that can at first resemble secondary or marginal areas. This marginality also signifies that a vio­lence, even a terrorism and other forms of hostage taking are at work. The exam­ples closest to us would be found in the area of laws [lois] on the teaching and practice of languages, the legitimization of canons, the military use of scientific research, abortion, euthanasia, problems of organ transplant, extra-uterine con­ception, bio-engineering, medical experimentation, the “social treatment” of AIDS, the macro- or micro-politics of drugs, homelessness, and so on, without forgetting; of course, the treatment of what one calls animal life, the immense question of so-called animality. On this last problem, the Benjamin text that I am coming to now shows that its author was not deaf or insensitive to it, even if his propositions on this subject remain quite obscure or traditional.

## Ethics OW Ontology

### Frontline

#### Prioritizing ontology and epistemology over specific policy formulations paralyzes problem solving measures ensuring short-term annihilation

#### Owen 2002

[David Owen Millennium Journale of international studies 2002 “Re-Orientation Internatioal Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning”]

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with **the philosophical turn** is that it **has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power** as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the **explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is** not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is **by no means** clear that it is, in contrast, wholly **dependent on** these **philosophical commitments**. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theoryto recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems**, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us**. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because **prioritisation of ontology and epistemology** promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, **it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach** to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, **‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’**.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, **this strategy** easily **slips into the promotion of** the pursuit of **generality over** that of **empirical validity**. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulatesthe idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

#### Extinction outweighs ontology – ontological capacity is inevitable – only extinction prevents true freedom

#### Jonas 1996

(Hans, Former Alvin Johnson Prof. Phil. – New School for Social Research and Former Eric Voegelin Visiting Prof. – U. Munich, “Morality and Mortality: A Search for the Good After Auschwitz”, p. 111-112)

With this look ahead at an ethics for the future, we are touching at the same time upon the question of the future of freedom. The unavoidable discussion of this question seems to give rise to misunderstandings. My dire prognosis that not only our material standard of living but also our democratic freedoms would fall victim to the growing pressure of a worldwide ecological crisis, until finally there would remain only some form of tyranny that would try to save the situation, has led to the accusation that I am defending dictatorship as a solution to our problems. I shall ignore here what is a confusion between warning and recommendation. But I have indeed said that such a **tyranny would still be better than total ruin**; thus, I have ethically accepted it as an alternative. I must now defend this standpoint, which I continue to support, before the court that I myself have created with the main argument of this essay. For **are we not contradicting ourselves in prizing physical survival at the price of freedom**? Did we not say that freedom was the condition of our capacity for responsibility—and that this capacity was a reason for the survival of humankind?; **By tolerating tyranny as an alternative to physical annihilation are we not violating the principle we established: that the How of existence must not take precedence over its Why? Yet we can make a terrible concession to the primacy of physical survival in** **the conviction that the ontological capacity for freedom, inseparable as it is from man's being, cannot really be extinguished, only temporarily banished from the public realm. This conviction can be supported by experience we are all familiar with. We have seen that even in the most totalitarian societies the urge for freedom on the part of some individuals cannot be extinguished, and this renews our faith in human beings**. Given this faith, we have reason to hope that, **as long as there are human beings who survive**, **the image of God will continue to exist along with them and will wait in concealment for its new hour.** **With that hope**—which in this particular case takes precedence over fear—**it is permissible, for the sake of physical survival, to accept if need be a temporary absence of freedom in the external affairs of humanity**. This is, I want to emphasize, a worst-case scenario, and it is the foremost task of responsibility at this particular moment in world history to prevent it from happening. This is in fact one of the noblest of duties (and at the same time one concerning self-preservation), on the part of the imperative of responsibility to avert future coercion that would lead to lack of freedom by acting freely in the present, thus preserving as much as possible the ability of future generations to assume responsibility. But more than that is involved. **At stake is the preservation of Earth's entire miracle of creation, of which our human existence is a part and before which man reverently bows**, **even without philosophical "grounding."** Here too faith may precede and reason follow; it is faith that longs for this preservation of the Earth (fides quaerens intellectum), and reason comes as best it can to faith's aid with arguments, not knowing or even asking how much depends on its success or failure in determining what action to take. With this confession of faith we come to the end of our essay on ontology.

### A2 Zimmerman

#### Their alternative dooms us to extinction – only pragmatic political action can solve and allow the space for metaphysical investigation. This also answers their argument that ontology outweighs nuclear war

#### Santoni 1985

[Ronald E. Santoni, Phil. Prof @ Denison, 1985, Nuclear War, ed. Fox and Groarke, p. 156-7]

To be sure, Fox sees the need for our undergoing “certain fundamental changes” in our “thinking, beliefs, attitudes, values” and **Zimmerman calls for a “paradigm shift**” in our thinking about ourselves, other, and the Earth. But **it is not clear that** what either offers as **suggestions** for what we can, must, or should do in the face of a runaway arms **race are sufficient to “wind down” the arms race before it leads to omnicide**. In spite of the importance of Fox’s analysis and reminders it is not clear that “admitting our (nuclear) fear and anxiety” to ourselves and “identifying the mechanisms that dull or mask our emotional and other responses” represent much more than examples of basic, often. stated principles of psychotherapy. Being aware of the psychological maneuvers that keep us numb to nuclear reality may well be the road to transcending them but it must only be a “first step” (as Fox acknowledges), during which we Simultaneously act to eliminate nuclear threats, break our complicity with the ams race, get rid of arsenals of genocidal weaponry, and create conditions for international goodwill, mutual trust, and creative interdependence. Similarly, in respect to Zimmerman: in spite of the challenging Heideggerian insights he brings out regarding what motivates the arms race, many questions may be raised about his prescribed “solutions.” Given our need for a paradigm shift in our (distorted) understanding of ourselves and the rest of being, are we merely left “to prepare for a possible shift in our self-understanding? (italics mine)? Is this all we can do? Is it necessarily the case that such a shift “cannot come as a result of our own will?” – and work – but only from “a destiny outside our control?” Does this mean we leave to God the matter of bringing about a paradigm shift? Granted our fears and the importance of not being controlled by fears, as well as our “anthropocentric leanings,” should we be as cautious as Zimmerman suggests about out disposition “to want to do something” or “to act decisively in the face of the current threat?” In spite of the importance of our taking on the anxiety of our finitude and our present limitation, **does it follow that “we should be willing** for the worst (i.e. **an all-out nuclear war) to occur”? Zimmerman wrongly**, I contend, **equates “resistance” with “denial”** when he says that “as long as we resist and deny the possibility of nuclear war, that possibility will persist and grow stronger.” He also wrongly perceives “resistance” as presupposing a clinging to the “order of things that now prevails.” Resistance connotes opposing, and striving to defeat a prevailing state of affairs that would allow or encourage the “worst to occur.” I submit, against Zimmerman, that we should not, in any sense, be willing for nuclear war or omnicide to occur. (This is *not* to suggest that we should be numb to the possibility of its occurrence.) Despite Zimmerman’s elaborations and refinements his Heideggerian notion of “**letting beings be” continues to be too permissive** in this regard. In my judgment, **an individual’s decision not to act against and resist his or her government’s preparations for nuclear holocaust is**, as I have argued elsewhere, **to be an early accomplice to the most horrendous crime against life imaginable – its annihilation**. The Nuremburg tradition calls not only for a new way of thinking, a “new internationalism” in which we all become co-nurturers of the whole planet, but for resolute actions that will sever our complicity with nuclear criminality and the genocidal arms race, and work to achieve a future which we can no longer assume. We must not only “come face to face with the unthinkable in image and thought” (Fox) but must act now - with a “new consciousness” and conscience - to prevent the unthinkable, by cleansing the earth of nuclear weaponry. Only when that is achieved wll ultimate violence be removed as the final arbiter of our planet’s fate.

### A2 Solves Violence

#### Privileging ontology over everything fails to prevent violence – it doesn’t question freedom in terms of violence

Child et al 1995

[Mark, PhD Candidate in Instructional Psychology @ BYU, "Autonomy or Heteronomy? Levinas's Challenge to Modernism and Postmodernism," <http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/EPS/Educational-Theory/Contents/45_2_Child_etal.asp>]

**If violence and oppression are to be avoided, the work of securing autonomy must itself be called into question**; in other words, the autonomy of the "I," the very act of freedom, must be called into question and shown to be unjust. While **the ontology of situatedness** does indeed mark, name, and argue for the conditions of possibility for "difference" or "otherness," it **does not call the freedom of the I into question ethically**; does not refer to the shame that the I feels in seeing its use of freedom to be murderous and usurpatory. Of course, there is a sense in which the ontology of situatedness does call the freedom of the I into question. By articulating the limits of situated existence it questions the I existentially. But this actually works to secure freedom rather than call it into question**. Knowing the ontological limits becomes itself a freedom; it enables self-rule**. That is, "**knowing" places the knower in a position both to comprehend the ontological limits of Being** (and thus beings, which renders others comprehensible in these terms) **and to take up resolutely that which is afforded, disclosed, or given within one's own situation**. In other words, "**knowing" places one in a position to take up resolutely and attenuate one's autonomy**. The appeal to situatedness articulates the limits and possibilities of Being. But this ontology cannot account for the calling into question ethically of the very " cans" and I/cannots," the very freedoms, of Being. This issue is at the heart of the criticism Levinas made of Martin Heidegger, perhaps the most influential "postmodern" philosopher of this century. In his monumental work, Being and Time, Heidegger "calls attention to the forgetting of Being," and attempts to (re)establish the "preeminence of ontology over metaphysics" (PII, p. 53).11 Heidegger argues that in seeking the metaphysical we have forgotten the here and now, earthly existence; we have forgotten Being. What is needed, he contends, is an interrogation and recovery of the meaning of Being.12 Thus he takes up the question: What is the meaning of Being?13 His response to this question is to reformulate our thinking in terms of the verbal form of "Be-ing" rather than the nominative form "Being." This enables him to interpret "Being" as always already relating; always already interpreting; always already "there," Be-ing. Heidegger's work brilliantly illuminates and renders intelligible what situated existence might mean. Dasein (literally, "Being-there") is Heidegger's way of referring to human existence as located, or situated, within and as a horizon. One's location as "Being-there" affords possibilities, or freedoms; it reveals and conceals. The freedom in "Being-there" consists in that which is afforded by one's place. in other words, the autonomy of Dasein is extended and maintained by taking up resolutely that which is afforded within the limits of Being-there. Heidegger's work exactingly and profoundly describes and analyzes many important aspects of what Levinas refers to as the self(same), or the play of earthly, sensuous existence (though the same and Dasein are not strictly synonymous**). Levinas's criticism of Heidegger's work is that his phenomenology illuminates the freedom of the self(same) in terms of Dasein, but does not refer to the possibility of the self(same) having its freedom called into question in other than ontological terms**. Levinas argues that the ontology of situated, temporal, embodied existence does not concern itself with the experience of having one's freedom, the freedom of the 1, put into question such that one's actions, or potential actions, are shown to be unjust, violent, or evil. In other words**, it overlooks the experience where one may, ontologically speaking, choose to commit violence, but where one concomitantly " knows" that doing so would be unjust**; where one is therefore awakened to a shame in regard to one's acts or potential acts. In Heidegger the focus remains on articulating the freedom of Being, and in resolutely taking up the freedom which is disclosed within the limits of Dasein. Thus, argues Levinas, he continues the work of securing and extending autonomy: When [Heideggerl sees man possessed by freedom rather than possessing freedom, he puts over man a neuter term [the freedom in Be-ing] which illuminates freedom without putting it in question. And thus he is not destroying, but summing up a whole current of Western philosophy (PII, p. 51). **The tendency**, then, **in postmodernism to place highest priority on ontology is problematic to the degree that it tends to "illuminate freedom without putting it in question" ethically**. **The problem is not with ontology per se, but with the work of making ontology preeminent; of subsuming ethics in ontology**. That is, we can make an ontological argument for ethics such as, a teacher cannot justify her teaching practices by appealing to a universal notion of what constitutes real learning because such universals are illusions. But an appeal to the ontology of situatedness does not account, for instance, for the teacher who, in her concrete relations with a particular child, finds her "project" deeply questioned and feels she ought not, in spite of her own good reasons to the contrary, do what she has the "authority" to do and the freedom to do. Moreover, it does not help us to get a sense for what might be happening when the teacher, who decides in fact to go ahead and do what she feels she ought not do, feels a need to justify her actions. **The ontology of situatedness is only suited to giving an account of ethics in terms of ontological, but not ethical, affordances and constraints**. That is, ideas such as justice, goodness, and peace are argued for by showing, for instance, how our place in the web of Being is one in which we are always already related and relating to the world around us. Thus, being situated means being interdependent. Understanding our interdependence should render us more concerned about living peaceably within our respective situations. But what does "peaceably" mean? If we are seeking the "truth" of this word in the direction of autonomy, then we will seek to know what living peaceably "is" ontologically so that we may then know how to live. But, as we have argued, **the work of securing autonomy by means of ontology can lead to violence and oppression**.

# Epistemology

## Yes Realism

### Realism Frontline

#### Evolutionary biology proves realism is inevitable

Thayer 2004

[Bradley, Associate Professor for the Department of Defense & Strategic Studies and a former Fellow @ the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict]

**Evolutionary theory allows realists to advance offensive realist arguments** without seeking an ultimate cause in either the anarchic international state system or in theological or metaphysical ideas. Realism based on evolutionary theory reaches the same conclusions, but the ultimate causal mechanism is different: human evolution in the anarchic and perilous conditions of the late-Pliocene, Pleistocene, and most of the Holocene epochs. Specially, **evolutionary theory explains why humans** are egoistic, strive **to dominate others, and make in-group/out-group distinctions. These adaptations** in turn **serve as a foundation for offensive realism.** The central issue here is what causes states to behave as offensive realists predict. Mearsheimer advances a powerful argument that anarchy is the fundamental cause of such behavior. The fact that there is no world government compels the leaders of states to take steps to ensure their security, such as striving to have a powerful military, aggressing when forced to do so, and forging and maintaining alliances. This is what neorealists call a self-help system: leaders of states are forced to take these steps because nothing else can guarantee their security in the anarchic world of international relations. I argue that evolutionary theory also offers a fundamental cause for offensive realist behavior. Evolutionary theory explains why individuals are motivated to act as offensive realism expects, whether an individual is a captain of industry or a conquistador. My argument is that anarchy is even more important than most scholars of international relations recognize. The **human environment of evolutionary adaptation was anarchic; our ancestors lived in a state of nature in which resources were poor and dangers from other humans** and the environment were great-so great that it is truly remarkable that a mammal standing three feet high-without claws or strong teeth, not particularly strong or swift-survived and evolved to become what we consider human. Humans endured because natural selection gave them the right behaviors to last in those conditions. The environment produced the behaviors examined here: **egoism, domination, and the in-group/out-group distinction. These** specific traits are sufficient to **explain why leaders will behave**, in the proper circumstances, **as offensive realists expect them to** behave. That is, even if they must hurt other humans or risk injury to themselves, they will strive to maximize their power, defined as either control over others (for example, through wealth or leadership) or control over ecological circumstances (such as meeting their own and their family’s or tribe’s need for food, shelter, or other resources). Evolutionary theory explains why people seek control over environmental circumstances-humans are egoistic and concerned about food-and why some, particularly males, will seek to dominate others by maintaining a privileged position in a dominance hierarchy. Clearly, **as the leaders of states are human, they too will be influenced by evolutionary theory as they respond to the actions of other states and as they make their own decisions.**

#### And - no other theory explains the world accurately

Mearsheimer 2001

[John J., Professor of Political Science @ the University of Chicago, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Pg. 1-3]

The optimists’ claim that security competition and war among the great powers has been burned out of the system is wrong. In fact, all of the major states around the globe still care deeply about the balance of power and are destined to compete for power among themselves for the foreseeable future. Consequently, **realism will offer the most powerful explanations of international politics over the next century, and this will be true even if the debates among academic and policy elites are dominated by non-realist theories. In short, the real world remains a realist world. States still fear each other and seek to gain power at each other’s expense, because international anarchy**-the driving force behind great-power behavior-did not change with the end of the Cold War, and there are few signs that such change is likely any time soon. States remain the principal actors in world politics and there is still no night watchman standing above them. For sure, the collapse of the Soviet Union caused a major shift in the global distribution of power. But it did not give rise to a change in the anarchic structure of the system, and without that kind of profound change, there is no reason to expect the great powers to behave much differently in the new century than they did in previous centuries. Indeed, **considerable evidence** from the 1990s indicates t**hat power politics has not disappeared** from Europe and Northeast Asia, the regions in which there are two or more great powers, as well as possible great powers such as Germany and Japan. There is no question, however, that the competition for power over the past decade has been low-key. Still, there is potential for intense security competition among the great powers that might lead to a major war. Probably the best evidence of that possibility is the fact that the United States maintains about one hundred thousand troops each in Europe and in Northeast Asia for the explicit purpose of keeping the major states in each region at peace.

### A2 Alt Solves

#### Nope – they need to articulate how they overcome biological tendencies towards violence – simply reorienting ourselves clearly doesn’t do that

#### It’s empirically disproven – people have tried to move away from realism in the past – there is either no alternative theory and attempts to move away cause conflicts over power which escalate in a world of perceived weakness

#### Kritiks of IR surrender the hope of change and can’t solve conflict – no concrete alternative

Jarvis 2000

[Darryl, Director of the Center for International Relations at the Univ. of Sydney, International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism]

But **regardless of the Pathology** or aetiological route **that caused** Ashley to arrive at **subversive postmodernism,** important questions of his thesis remain. **How is this meant to help those on the margins, the poor, the weak, and the powerless**, for whom Ashley professes great concern? How does it help those who seek answers as practitioners and theorists of international relations? **If it is meant to empower feminists, scholars of color, and other persons who have suffered so-called disciplinary violence, how precisely does it intend to do this? If it cannot chart new directions and resists the modernist urge to guide and assist us in our dilemmas,** refuses to confer general interpretations and enhance our understanding, **how might it** better our well being or **resolve conflict and atrocity**? What precisely does Ashley lay claim to do? Apart from seeking the closure of modernity, what does Ashley suggest we put in its place or is it simply a question of leaving empty the space vacated by modernist theory and knowledge? These questions alone are cause for concern. However, as I have endeavored to demonstrate in this chapter, Ashley does not answer these questions but, instead, derides those who ask them. **It is** perhaps **time to** resist such derision and **return to these questions, since in the absence of posing them we surrender the purpose of theory**, its meaning, utility, and progress, indeed the study of international relations, **to those who would pretend that these issues are no longer of any importance.**

### A2 Realism Bad

#### Can’t read turns without winning the Uniqueness debate – If we win realism is inevitable then realism bad means nothing

#### They must win an alt – even if we did something bad it doesn’t mean we lose – voting neg doesn’t change material reality and prevents action to stop problems

Jarvis 2000

[Darryl, Director of the Center for International Relations at the University of Sydney, International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism]

There is, however, a distinct difference between idealists of the past and postmodernists of the present. Previous idealist thought, for example was interspersed with constructive endeavor to erect new forms of international organization through constitutional means or the rule of law; legislative proposals were suggested for the mediation of disputes; and public education was pursued as a means of forewarning populations of the horrors of war and the dangers of unrestrained nationalism. While such might have seemed fanciful in view of the political realities of the day, all were engaged in the world of policy to one degree or another, and all attempted to contributed to, and strengthen, civil society. In the haste to resistance, however, progress and achievement are now measured by one’s contribution to the subversion and undermining of civil society. And, in a rather perverse rendering of political relevance, **postmodernists operate from the assumption that terminological obfuscation, epistemological debate, and ontological altercation will yet save the world and make it better for all.** That the “Great Epistemological Pause of the 1990s,” as Holsti calls it, is bent on saving the world from positivism and that there are those among us who think that the lives of ordinary women and men will be improved because of it should be ringing the alarm bells that a self-absorbed intelligentsia lost in obscure specialism no longer has much to say to the world they write so passionately about. **We are,** in short, **in danger of becoming irrelevant and de-inventing ourselves,** have become too clever with words and games, and altogether too preoccupied with things unconnected to international relations. As Stephen Chan notes, “**There is a retreat into introspection**, perhaps into an exemplary ‘life as art’ syndrome – much beloved by the interviewers and biographers of Foucault.” **Yet**, as Chan also reminds us, **the question remains, “exemplary for whom, on behalf of what?” Deconstructed or not, the problems of interational relations are still with us and will not go away.**

#### Realism is a diverse theory – they have to prove our defense of realism specifically is bad

Solomon 1996

[Hussein, Senior Researcher, Human Security Project, Institute for Defence Policy, “In Defence of Realism,” African Security Review, vol. 5, no. 2, <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/5No2/5No2/InDefence.html>]

But, this is not all. **Not only are there `substantial’ differences between realists, but also in the writings of a single realist**. For instance, the last page of Carr’s Twenty Years Crisis (1966) contains an appeal to the idea of spreading community beyond national frontiers. And the state-centric Hans Morgenthau later in life advocated world government.43 Keenan44 meanwhile, the creator of containment, became relaxed about the Soviet threat and decidedly anti-nuclear. Brodie, the inventor of deterrence, came to see the historic obsolescence of war, and argued that war is a moral arena.45 Fox, the coiner of the term ‘superpower’, asked who the ‘real realists’ were these days, and made it clear that he did not think they were those whom he called the ‘doctrinal realists’ who had come to dominate the subject.46 What is clear from the above is that realism, both in theory and practice, is not as simple as the post-modernists claim it to be. **This** fact, however, **has serious implications for the post-modernist critique of realism**. George47 posits the notion that realism leads to war and devastation. Vale implies that realism drove apartheid’s foreign and domestic policies, and in particular the notion of the ‘Total Onslaught’.48 However, **if one accepts the complexity of realism in theory and practice, one would find such an oversimplified causal relationship between realism and war, or realism and apartheid difficult to sustain**.

### A2 Bleiker

#### There are no “Gatekeepers” of IR – critics of realism are not marginalized but have become the new hegemonic center of the discipline

Jarvis 2000

(Darryl, Director of the Center for International Relations at the University of Sydney, International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism)

In the space of only a few short years the poststructural challenge to international theory has risen to prominence. What once was a “marginal” activity dispensed by an “exiled” few now attracts numerous cohorts who issue their attacks against the discipline from within its hegemonic center. For Ashley and Walker, this signals “a crisis of confidence, a loss of faith, a degeneration of reigning paradigms, an organic crisis in which, as Gramscians would say, ‘the old is dying and the new cannot yet be born.’” Needless to say, both Ashley and Walker celebrate this trend. For them, “the game is pretty much up,” and “the crisis of international studies” merely reflects a whole series of crises in modern culture: “a crisis of patriarchy, a crisis of governability, [and] a generalized crisis of representation.” Whether in the proliferation works of dissident thought, in the informal xerox-circuits of the field, or in the seminar papers of graduate students, Ashley and Walker “detect an increasing volume and variety of work whose principal business is to interrogate limits … and to think other-wise.” Despite the “oppressive” legacy of positivist social science, these happenings, they insist, “indicate the opening up of international studies into a boundless space of freedom,” where marginality is fast becoming the norm and where the “cocksure voice of sovereign judgment” now trembles in self-doubt. Doubtless, Ashley and Walker overstate the success and attraction postpositivist approaches for political reasons. Yet there is also much truth in what they claim; **the lexicon of poststructural theory has** indeed **become commonplace in the field and far from a marginal or ostracized activity**. The discipline’s most eminent journals, for example, commonly feature articles with a postmodernist perspective. Indeed, the willing complicity of disciplinary journals to publish these perspectives has, ironically, been one of the main vehicles by which Ashley and Walker have promoted and popularized their agenda. **This fact alone would seem to make a mockery of their allegations of victimization,** and how, under “the threat of some deprival of status, tenancy, or right to speak, be heard, and earn a living among the ranks of the profession,” so-called disciplinary marginals are “coerced into submission.” Such **threats are** surely **more imagined than real**, and the suggestion of coercion **almost ludicrous when one considers how those who “think other-wise” have been so prolific in filling the discipline’s learned journals,** conferences, and graduate seminars with voluminous postmodernist literatures. One can either be victimized or successfully published, but scarcely both. The absurdity of this suggestion, however, seems to have escaped **Ashley and Walker**, **who list a litany of charges against realism** and realists, of intimidation, coercion, and exclusion, **but communicate these repressive horrors via a special issue of International Studies Quarterly, the discipline’s flagship journa**l. Apparently, those inclined to “conspicuous displays of violence” fail to count censorship among their tools of repression and banishment. **Cries of victimization thus ring hollow** when they are so well heard, so often repeated, and given so much freedom to be expressed in so many publications.

### A2 Can’t Explain Cooperation

#### Realism can account for cooperation – The concepts of Anarchy and Order, Foreign and Domestic are not mutually exclusive

Solomon 1996

(Hussein, Senior Researcher, Human Security Project, Institute for Defence Policy, “In Defence of Realism,” African Security Review, vol. 5, no. 2, <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/5No2/5No2/InDefence.html>)

**George77 challenges the realists by asking them to account for regime co-operation** in a situation of endemic anarchy. As has been noted above, however, **this is** **precisely the question which occupied the minds of Waltz and the other neo-realists**. It is not the intention to reiterate the above arguments, but rather to attempt to clarify the meaning and consequences of anarchy in realist thought.

**Anarchy is a central pillar in realist thought. Its literal meaning is ‘absence of government’. However, this should not be interpreted as disorder, confusion and chaos** (as George wrongly does). **Thus, anarchy and order, are not necessarily mutually exclusive in traditional international relations theory. States,** realists note, **do in fact form a primitive society with rules, norms and values** (such as respect for the territorial sovereignty of states).78 However, these rules, norms and values are not as well developed between states as they are within states. **The cases cited earlier regarding the US mining Nicaragua’s harbours, the bombing of the ‘Rainbow Warrior’, and the alleged Libyan involvement in the bombing over Lockerbie demonstrate the tentative nature of what is termed ‘international law’. Thus anarchy exists between states** (referring to an absence of world government and where states answer to no higher authority but themselves), **but there is also a form of primitive society co-existing with this anarchy**. This led Hedley Bull to describe the interstate system as "*the anarchical society*".79 The concept of anarchy, however, holds other implications. **The lack of a common government or a universally recognised common external authority is what distinguishes the international from the domestic realms of politics and law. The notions of sovereignty and independence in this way are either a consequence of, or a reason for this condition**.80 However, **demarcating domestic from international politics, does not necessarily mean seeing one in isolation from another; they are rather seen as interrelated**. For example, at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Prussia’s Metternich and other conservative monarchies, fearing the spread of the ideas of the French Revolution decided to band together to stop this. Thus Metternich’s ‘Concert system’ proposed a kind of international policing regime for he feared that revolutionary French ideas such as the notion of equality might become a factor in the domestic politics of conservative Prussia. The example cited above is also instructive for another reason: it explains why states co-operate that are of necessity in conflict and competition with each other. **States**, history emphasises, **co-operate with each other when it is in their interest to do so. After the conservative monarchies of Europe weathered the storm of the populist** 1848 **revolutions, very little commonality remained between them, and the ‘Concert system’ all but fell into disarray.** When the Crimean War broke out in 1854 it officially sealed the death of the ‘Concert system’.81 The predominance of the concept of national self-interest in the *"anarchical society"*will be returned to in the next section.

### A2 Globalization Disproves

#### Globalization and Integration don’t disprove realism – state interests are still at the heart of world politics

Solomon 1996

[Hussein, Senior Researcher, Human Security Project, Institute for Defence Policy, “In Defence of Realism,” African Security Review, vol. 5, no. 2, <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/5No2/5No2/InDefence.html>]

**Post-modernists launch** yet **another attack which ‘proves’ the withering away of the State**: regional integration and **global interdependence, they assert, undermine state sovereignty**.89 However, **one finds that the reality is far more nuanced than the post-modernists allege. In post-modern accounts of interdependence the structural disparities** and exclusions which form part of the process of interdependence and integration in modern world politics **are often missing. Consider the level of interdependence between the US and Mexico within** the North American Free Trade Agreement **(NAFTA). Can one argue that the US is just as dependent on Mexico as Mexico is on the US**? An example closer to home is the interdependence between South Africa and Lesotho within the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). Can one argue that South Africa is as dependent on Lesotho as Lesotho is on South Africa? **The point is that post-modern accounts of interdependence invariably attempt to show it occurring in a harmonious, horizontal and equitable manner. Reality**, however, **indicates that interdependence occurs in precisely the opposite way. Vertical or unequal relations guided by national self-interest has been the norm. States will co-operate with each other on a specific issue because it is in the national interest to do so. However, where such co-operation comes into conflict with the interest of the State, it would cease rather quickly**. Such interdependence has been with us for millennia and will be with us for millennia to come. **Consider the temporary alliance between the antagonists Persia and Sparta on the question of Athenian supremacy at sea during the Peloponnesian war** around 420 BC. Or consider Rome’s dependence on gold from Africa to maintain its hegemony, especially during the Punic wars when it faced Hannibal’s forces**. Regional interdependence and integration, or inter-state co-operation in general, should not be seen as the forerunner of some sort of global polity; rather it should be seen as the workings of national self-interest**. Consider in this regard the US’ ambivalent position within the Pacific Community, the disintegration of the East African Community, Nigeria’s behaviour within ECOWAS, or the fears of smaller SADCC states of Zimbabwean hegemony in the 1980s.90 As SADCC evolved into the SADC, these fears have shifted to South Africa as a possible regional hegemon.

### A2 Morality

#### Realism best describes justice – we don’t ignore the issue of morality, we just acknowledge that security is a prerequisite for justice – also means that if we win any offense you vote aff

Solomon 1996

[Hussein, Senior Researcher, Human Security Project, Institute for Defence Policy, “In Defence of Realism,” African Security Review, vol. 5, no. 2, <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/5No2/5No2/InDefence.html>]

The Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal raised questions about the "moral relativism" of US politics generally, and of US foreign policy in particular. **The** combined **effect of all this was a serious debate on the relationship between morality and foreign policy** by the mid-1970s, **with the argument revolving around competing priorities of order and justice. Should the nation’s geo-political interest in building a stable international order take precedence over its moral commitment to human rights?** Or should human rights come first even if that approach jeopardised the prospects for stability?72 **The realist position was clear: order was the prerequisite for justice. This was not a negation of human rights in foreign policy.** **Niebuhr** had worked out the argument years before when he had **pointed out that human rights could hardly flourish in conditions of war, anarchy, or revolution. "Some balance of power is the basis of whatever justice is achieved in international relations" he wrote** in 1942.73 Henry **Kissinger embraced this** as Secretary of State: "**The true task of citizenship is to draw from the balance of power a more positive capacity to better the human condition**." Or, as he put it in his memoirs: **"If history teaches anything it is that there can be no peace without equilibrium and no justice without restraint."74**

### A2 Determinism Bad

#### No Link and Turn – Evolutionary theory argues that genes impact behavior probabilistically based on the environmental context – the alternative is environmental determinism which turns the K

Thayer 2004

(Bradley, Professor at Baylor University Dept. of Political Science, “Evolution and the American social sciences”, Politics and the Life Sciences, vol. 23, no. 1, December, Ebsco)

Is evolutionary theory deterministic? Thankfully, no. **Evolutionary theory does not submit that all human behavior is read from human genes**. There are two points to discuss here. First, **genes impact behavior,** to be sure. **But this impact most often is probabilistic, not deterministic,** as Pinker reminds us. Second, no prominent contemporary evolutionary theorist, including William Hamilton, John Maynard Smith, Ernst Mayr, Robert Trivers, George Williams, D. S. Wilson, and E. O. Wilson, has argued that human behavior is solely determined by genes. As Maynard Smith argues, the charge of genetic **determinism "is** **largely irrelevant, because [deterministic views are] not held by anyone**, or at least not by any competent evolutionary biologist." Contemporary evolutionary theorists recognize that **human behavior is genetically bounded but environmentally contextual, neither haphazard nor predestined**. The great biologist Sewall Wright captured this point: "The Darwinian process of continued interplay of a random and a selective process is not intermediate between pure chance and pure determination, but in its consequences qualitatively utterly different from either." Genuine "determinists," Pinker recounts, reject this complexity: "Among the radical scientists and the many intellectuals they have influenced, 'determinism' has taken on a meaning that is diametrically opposed to its true meaning, [and it is now] used to refer to any claim that people have a tendency to act in certain ways in certain circumstances." For those who charge "genetic determinism" when we analyze human behavior, any "probability greater than zero is equated with a probability of 100 percent. Zero innateness is the only acceptable belief, and all departures from it are treated as equivalent." Ironically, **evolutionary social scientists are actually less "deterministic" than those of their traditionalist colleagues who argue that environment explains all.**

### A2 K of Sociobiology

#### The alt is worse – making arguments without scientific backing means we can’t disprove theories like scientific racism – the only way to disprove that is by referencing biology

#### Our argument is not biological essentialism – choice and environment matter as well – we just say that in a large enough group of people, evolutionary adaptations will sometimes manifest in certain behaviors – there are always some behaviors we can’t eliminate

#### No link – sociobiology does not proscribe policies and Clarity in purpose solves the impact

Thayer 2004

[Bradley, Professor at Baylor University Dept. of Political Science, “Evolution and the American social sciences”, Politics and the Life Sciences, vol. 23, no. 1, December, Ebsco]

While challenging liberalism in some respects, **evolutionary theory in political application** also **arouses suspicion**. Like a radioisotope with a long half-life. **Social Darwinism remains dangerous, engendering the fear that *any* evolutionary argument will lead again to horrible policies. Of course. Social Darwinists abused and contorted Darwin's ideas to suit their favored policies and to support their prejudices. What should evolutionary social scientists do** when confronted with the fear of a rebirth of Social Darwinist thought? **They should tell the truth**, proudly **confessing an intention to interpret human political behavior in the light of evolutionary theory and strenuously denying an intention to prescribe policies** designed to advance some fanciful notion of evolutionary "purpose."

#### Denial of human nature equates to a denial of truth – this idea is responsible for the greatest atrocities in history – it also turns the K since denial isolates academia and causes backlash

Pinker 2002

[Steven, Professor of Psychology at Harvard, The Blank Slate: the Modern Denial of Human Nature, p. x-xi]

**The taboo on human nature has** not just put blinkers on researchers but **turned any discussion of it into a heresy that must be stamped out.** Many **writers are so desperate to discredit** any suggestion of an **innate human constitution that they have thrown logic and civility out the window**. Elementary distinctions — “some” versus “all,” “probable” versus “always,” “is” versus “ought” — are eagerly flouted to paint human nature as an extremist doctrine and thereby steer readers away from it. The analysis of ideas is commonly replaced by political smears and personal attacks. This poisoning of the intellectual atmosphere has left us unequipped to analyze pressing issues about human nature just as new scientific discoveries are making them acute. **The denial of human nature has spread beyond the academy and has led to a disconnect between intellectual life and common sense.** I first had the idea of writing this book when I started a collection of astonishing claims from pundits and social critics about the malleability of the human psyche: that little boys quarrel and fight because they are encouraged to do so; that children enjoy sweets because their parents use them as a reward for eating vegetables; that teenagers get the idea to compete in looks and fashion from spelling bees and academic prizes; that men think the goal of sex is an orgasm because of the way they were socialized. The problem is not just that these claims are preposterous but that the writers did not acknowledge they were saying things that common sense might call into question. **This is the mentality of a cult, in which fantastical beliefs are flaunted as proof of one's piety. That mentality cannot coexist with an esteem for the truth, and** I believe **it is responsible for** some of the unfortunate trends in recent intellectual life. One trend is a stated **contempt** among many scholars **for the concepts of truth, logic, and evidence**. Another is a hypocritical divide between what intellectuals say in public and what they really believe. A third **is the inevitable reaction: a culture** of “politically incorrect” shock jocks **who revel in anti-intellectualism and bigotry, emboldened by the knowledge that the intellectual establishment has forfeited claims to credibility in the eyes of the public. Finally, the denial of human nature has not just corrupted the world of critics and intellectuals but has done harm to the lives of real people.** The theory that parents can mold their children like clay has inflicted childrearing regimes on parents that are unnatural and sometimes cruel. It has distorted the choices faced by mothers as they try to balance their lives, and multiplied the anguish of parents whose children haven't turned out the way they hoped. **The belief that human tastes are reversible cultural preferences has led social planners to write off people's enjoyment** of ornament, natural light, and human scale and force millions of people to live in drab cement boxes. **The romantic notion that all evil is a product of society has justified the release of dangerous psychopaths who promptly murdered innocent people. And the conviction****{xi}  that humanity could be reshaped by massive social engineering projects led to some of the greatest atrocities in history.**

## Yes Liberalism

### Frontline

#### International liberalism is true – cooperation and interdependence will determine state behavior. Realists are streets behind.

Fettweis 2006

[Christopher, Profess at the National Security Decision Making Department at US Naval War College, 'A Revolution in International Relation Theory: Or, What If Mueller Is Right?,' International Studies Review]

Most IR scholarship carries on as if such an anomaly simply does not exist. This is especially true of realists, whose theories typically leave little room for fundamental systemic change (Lebow 1994). "The game of politics does not change from age to age," argued a skeptical Colin Gray (1999:163), "let alone from decade to decade." Indeed, the most powerful counterargument to Mueller—and one that is ultimately unanswerable—is that this period of peace will be temporary and that someday these trends will be reversed. Neorealists traditionally contend that the anarchic structure of the system stacks the deck against long-term stability, which accounts for "war's dismal recurrence throughout the millennia," in the words of Kenneth Waltz (1989:44). Other scholars are skeptical about the explanatory power of ideas, at least as independent variables in models of state behavior (Mearsheimer 1994/1995; Brooks and Wohlforth 2000/2001; Copeland 2003). However, one need not be convinced about the potential for ideas to transform international politics to believe that major war is extremely unlikely to recur. Mueller, Mandelbaum, Ray, and others may give primary credit for the end of major war to ideational evolution akin to that which made slavery and dueling obsolete, but others have interpreted the causal chain quite differently. Neoliberal institutionalists have long argued that complex economic interdependence can have a pacifying effect upon state behavior (Keohane and Nye 1977, 1987). Richard Rosecrance (1986, 1999) has contended that evolution in socio-economic organization has altered the shortest, most rational route to state prosperity in ways that make war unlikely. Finally, many others have argued that credit for great power peace can be given to the existence of nuclear weapons, which make aggression irrational(Jervis 1989; Kagan et al. 1999). With so many overlapping and mutually reinforcing explanations, at times the end of major war may seem to be overdetermined (Jervis 2002:8–9). For purposes of the present discussion, successful identification of the exact cause of this fundamental change in state behavior is probably not as important as belief in its existence. In other words, the outcome is far more important than the mechanism. The importance of Mueller's argument for the field of IR is ultimately not dependent upon why major war has become obsolete, only that it has. Almost as significant, all these proposed explanations have one important point in common: they all imply that change will be permanent. Normative/ideational evolution is typically unidirectional—few would argue that it is likely, for instance, for slavery or dueling to return in this century. The complexity of economic interdependence is deepening as time goes on and going at a quicker pace. And, obviously, nuclear weapons cannot be uninvented and (at least at this point) no foolproof defense against their use seems to be on the horizon. The combination of forces that may have brought major war to an end seems to be unlikely to allow its return. The twentieth century witnessed an unprecedented pace of evolution in all areas of human endeavor, from science and medicine to philosophy and religion. In such an atmosphere, it is not difficult to imagine that attitudes toward the venerable institution of war may also have experienced rapid evolution and that its obsolescence could become plausible, perhaps even probable, in spite of thousands of years of violent precedent. The burden of proof would seem to be on those who maintain that the "rules of the game" of international politics, including the rules of war, are the lone area of human interaction immune to fundamental evolution and that, due to these immutable and eternal rules, war will always be with us. Rather than ask how major war could have grown obsolete, perhaps scholars should ask why anyone should believe that it could not.

#### Their arguments are hype – they romanticize the past and ignore empirical evidence

Fettweis 2006

[Christopher, Profess at the National Security Decision Making Department at US Naval War College, 'A Revolution in International Relation Theory: Or, What If Mueller Is Right?,' International Studies Review]

Mueller (1995:14) described the tendency of people to romanticize the past, elevating prior ages over the present, even if today for the first time there is no danger of major, cataclysmic war. Human beings have a tendency to look backward with misty eyes, to see the past as much more benign, simple, and innocent than it really was. … That is, no matter how much better the present gets, the past gets better in reflection, and we are, accordingly, always notably worse off than we used to be. Golden ages, thus, do happen, but we are never actually in them: they are always back there somewhere (or, sometimes, in the ungraspable future). "As big problems … become resolved," Mueller (1995:8) argues, "we tend to elevate smaller ones, sometimes by redefinition or by raising standards, to take their place." Today a golden age of peace may well be dawning, but human nature might make it impossible for both citizens and scholars to appreciate its benefits. Widespread recognition of fundamental changes in state behavior often occurs slowly—after all, long-held beliefs take time to change. Too many analysts have made deep emotional and intellectual investments based upon assumptions of static and unchanging behavior across regions and eras for there to be much rapid evolution in IR theory. In this case, the international system may be demonstrating a potential to change greater than that of the scholars who spend their lives observing it. But one point seems incontrovertible: if, indeed, major war has become obsolete, then the field of IR cannot remain simultaneously unchanged and accurate. The implications of great power peace would be hard to overestimate. In fact, only a few observers inside and outside the academy seem to have grasped the possibility that the world stands at the edge of such a golden age, terrorist incidents notwithstanding. "Here at the end of the 20th century," the late historian Stephen Ambrose (1999) argued toward the end of his life, "we once again live in a time where it is possible to believe in progress, to believe that things will get better." "Things" have gotten better for the vast majority of the world's people, a higher percentage of whom live in peace than at any time in history. And most importantly, **none** are experiencing **major war.** For the first time in history, it is possible to believe **they never will.**

### Liberalism Inevitable

#### The liberal international order will persist indefinitely – multiple reasons

Ikenberry 2010

[G. John, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and a Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University, Korea“The Liberal International Order and its Discontents,” Millennium – Journal of International Studies 2010; 38; 509]

There are also reasons to think that this liberal order will persist, even if it continues to evolve. Firstly, the violent forces that have overthrown international orders in the past do not seem to operate today. We live in the longest period of ‘great power peace’ in modern history. The great powers have not found themselves at war with each other since the guns fell silent in 1945. This non-war outcome is certainly influenced by two realities: nuclear deterrence, which raises the costs of war, and the dominance of democracies, who have found their own pathway to peace. In the past, the great moments of order-building came in the aftermath of war when the old order was destroyed. War itself was a ratification of the view that the old order was no longer sustainable. War broke the old order apart, propelled shifts in world power and opened up the international landscape for new negotiations over the rules and principles of world politics. In the absence of great power war it is harder to clear the ground for new ‘constitutional’ arrangements. Secondly, this order is also distinctive in its integrative and expansive character. In essence, it is ‘easy to join and hard to overturn’. This follows most fundamentally from the fact that it is a liberal international order – in effect, it is an order that is relatively open and loosely rulebased. The order generates participants and stakeholders. Beyond this, there are three reasons why the architectural features of this post-war liberal order reinforce downward and outward integration. One is that the multilateral character of the rules and institutions create opportunities for access and participation. Countries that want to join in can do so; Japan found itself integrating through participation in the trade system and alliance partnership. More recently, China has taken steps to join, at least through the world trading system. Joining is not costless. Membership in institutional bodies such as the WTO must be voted upon by existing members and states must meet specific requirements. But these bodies are not exclusive or imperial. Secondly, the liberal order is organised around shared leadership and not just the United States. The G-7/8 is an example of a governance organisation that is based on a collective leadership, and the new G-20 grouping has emerged to provide expanded leadership. Finally, the order also provides opportunities for a wide array of states to gain access to the ‘spoils of modernity’. Again, this is not an imperial system in which the riches accrue disproportionately to the centre. States across the system have found ways to integrate into this order and experience economic gains and rapid growth along the way. Thirdly, rising states do not constitute a bloc that seeks to overturn or reorganise the existing international order. China, India, Russia, Brazil, South Africa and others all are seeking new roles and more influence within the global system. But they do not constitute a new coalition of states seeking global transformation. All of these states are capitalist and as such are deeply embedded in the world economy. Most of them are democratic and embrace the political principles of the older Western liberal democracies. At the same time, they all have different geopolitical interests. They are as diverse in their orientations as the rest of the world in regard to energy, religion and ideologies of development. They are not united by a common principled belief in a post-liberal world order. They are all very much inside the existing order and integrated in various ways into existing governance institutions. Fourthly, the major states in the system – the old great powers and rising states – all have complex alignments of interests. They all are secure in the sense that they are not threatened by other major states. All worry about radicalism and failed states. Even in the case of the most fraught relationships – such as the emerging one between the United States and China – there are shared or common interests in global issues related to energy and the environment. These interests are complex. There are lots of ways in which these countries will compete with each other and seek to push ‘adjustment’ to problems onto the other states. But it is precisely the complexity of these shared interests that creates opportunities and incentives to negotiate and cooperate – and, ultimately, to support the open and rule-based frameworks that allow for bargains and agreements to be reached. Overall, these considerations suggest that the leading states of the world system are travelling along a common pathway to modernity. They are not divided by great ideological clashes or emboldened by the potential gains from great power war. These logics of earlier orders are not salient today. Fascism, communism and theocratic dictatorships cannot propel you along the modernising pathway. In effect, if you want to be a modern great power you need to join the WTO. The capitalist world economy and the liberal rules and institutions that it supports – and that support it – are foundational to modernisation and progress. The United States and other Western states may rise or fall within the existing global system but the liberal character of that system still provides attractions and benefits to most states within it and on its edges.

### A2 Ks of Liberalism

#### Institutional liberalism is distinct – doesn’t link to your intervention Ks

Cerny 2005

[Susanne Soederberg, Professor in International Development Studies @ Queen's University, Georg Menz, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Pittsburgh, BA in International Relations, and Philip G. Cerny, Prof of Global Political Economy, pg 21, CH1: “ Different Roads to Globalization: Neoliberalism, the Competition State, and Politics in a More Open World,” Internalizing Globalization: The Rise of Neoliberalism and the Decline of National Varieties of Capitalism, PALGRAVE MACMILLAN: Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire]

In international relations and international political economy liberalism – and, today, **neoliberalism – can** **also be seen as having two distinct meanings. The first** of these originally **derives from** the quasi-idealist tradition of ‘liberal internationalism’ that was associated with the legacy of Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations. Liberal internationalism involved **the construction of international – intergovernmental – institutions made up of sovereign states, the provision of ‘collective security’, and the expansion of international law along relatively liberal lines**. The United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights is seen as a key document in this tradition, along with UN sponsorship of development, health, food and housing programs, and the like.

The establishment of the Bretton Woods system of **international economic institutions at the end of the Second World War is also seen to represent international economic liberalism** – what John Gerard Ruggie called the postwar system of ‘embedded liberalism’. However, **Ruggie’s analysis went much further, linking international economic liberalism** with Americanstyle **domestic liberalism** (or European-style social democracy) through **Keynesian macroeconomic policies, the welfare state**, German-style **neocorporatism, French-style indicative planning, the Bretton Woods system, and elements of the postwar consensus (**Ruggie, 1982). **It is this latter sort of domestic, interventionist liberalism that today’s neoliberalism opposes.**

### A2 Exclusion

#### Liberalism isn’t exclusive – exclusion only exists because of a failure to fully carry out its principles

Bronner 2004

[Stephen Eric, Professor of Political Science and Comparative Literature at Rutgers University, “Reclaiming the Enlightenment” Columbia University Press p. 49-50]

Women, people of color, Catholics, atheists, and those without property16— for very different reasons—had no place in the original liberal vision. But this was the product less of some inherent defect of liberalism than the unwillingness of liberals to confront existing prejudices with the logic of their principles. Institutionalizing the universal may not have immediately resulted in recognizing the legitimacy of the outsider, or the “other,” but it served as the precondition for doing so. If patriarchy is now seen as having been ignored in the universal social contract,17 for example, the oversight was actually recognized at the time.18 Women would, in any case, not have attempted to further their interests by using the arguments of “antiphilosophes” like Justus Moser, who authored “On the Diminished Disgrace of Whores and Their Children in Our Day” (1772), or Louis Bonald, who thundered against divorce. Olympe de Gouges in The Rights of Woman (1791), and Mary Wollstonecraft in her Vindication of the Rights of Women (1792) instead referred to the original liberal values of the Enlightenment in criticizing the French Revolution for not realizing its universal commitments with respect to women: in the process, both radicalized the purely formal implications of equality under the law. Their undertaking is both related to yet different from that of the young Marx in On the Jewish Question and The Holy Family. These writings highlighted the contradiction between the political commitment of the bourgeois state to liberty, equality, and fraternity on the level of the state—that is freedom from the exercise of arbitrary power, equality before the law, and a concern with the common good—when coupled with the existence of coercion, inequality, and egoism in the economic realm of civil society. In extending democracy from the formal to the substantive, to be sure, he sought the “sublation” (Aufhebung) of both the state and civil society from the perspective of realizing “human” emancipation. This romantic and utopian vision, however, had far less practical impact than his clarification of the limits of classical liberalism with respect to “social” equality. What marks the criticisms of classical liberalism launched by feminists like Olympe de Gouges and Wollstonecraft no less than Marx, in any event, is their attempt to extend its implications. This differentiates them from conservative critics like Edmund Burke who, while he may have supported a cause like the American Revolution, also championed by most philosophes, did so more in terms of a newly constituted organic tradition than from the perspective of the Declaration of Independence. In the guise of attacking the French Revolution, Burke actually attacked the very idea of universal rights and the possibility of altering the English class structure. His emphasis on community and tradition, indeed, becomes little more than a façade for opposing the exercise of liberty, the pursuit of equality, and the “sordid darkness of this enlightened age.”

### A2 Wilderson K of Liberalism

#### Their pessimism is wrong – liberalism has been a global force for good

Totolo 2011

[Edoardo for ISN Insights , The Return of 'Afro-Optimism', jan 20, 2011, International Relations and Security Network. <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/ISN-Insights/Detail?lng=en&id=126250&contextid734=126250&contextid735=126249&tabid=126249>]

**For the first time since the seventies experts agree on Africa’s promising growth prospects and potential to become a major investment frontier of the future – though risks still abound.** Here are some of key factors to watch in 2011. **Sub-Saharan Africa has long suffered from very** [negative representation in the media](http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/01/opinion/01iht-edoppen.1.5959561.html). **It was only a few years ago when** The Economist **called it a "**[hopeless continent](http://www.economist.com/node/333429)", and the G8 in Gleneagles (2008) considered it a "scar on the conscience of the world". In some circles, **images of poverty and despair became a distorted way of 'branding' Africa**. Driven by genuine intentions to help the disadvantaged, some donation-hungry humanitarian organizations spread images of social degradation using a much criticized communication technique recently discarded as "[poverty-porn](http://www.owen.org/blog/3018)" by [intellectuals-turned-bloggers](http://aidwatchers.com/tag/poverty-porn/). However, 2010 may have given rise to a new trend and indeed a new way of seeing Africa. South African President Jacob Zuma said at a recent press conference that the World Cup gave birth to " [a new era of Afro-optimism](http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iXc5gadKi9kP1uJBYgTAUB6ftIZw?docId=CNG.9deed555661c2e4b27d72374f8080915.161) ". A series of influential publications last year led by McKinsey's "[Lions on the Move](http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications/progress_and_potential_of_african_economies/index.asp)", Steve Radelet's "[Emerging Africa](http://www.brookings.edu/press/Books/2010/emergingafrica.aspx)" and the recent IMF [Regional Economic Outlook](http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2010/AFR/eng/sreo1010.htm) provided optimistic prospects for this years' growth in the region and for future development opportunities. After the 'lost decade' of the nineties, when numerous economies in the region stagnated or registered negative growth, the continent has grown at an average of five percent per year since the new millennium. Demonstrating an unexpected macroeconomic solidity, most countries were relatively unharmed by the 2007-2008 global financial meltdown. Indeed the continent is estimated to grow at an average of 5.5 percent in 2011. Growth estimates for the next five years show that [seven out of the ten fastest growing world economies will be from Africa](http://www.economist.com/node/17853324?story_id=17853324), particularly Ethiopia, Mozambique and Tanzania. Growth in the coming years will be driven by increased investments as well as an expansion of trade and domestic consumer markets. However, international investors are aware of the daunting problems afflicting the sub-Saharan region and the immediate risks linked to corruption, weak political systems and social tensions, which may get worse in 2011 as 17 presidential elections are scheduled to take place across the region. **Investment opportunities** Returns on investments in Africa are today the [highest in the developing world](http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/Economic_Studies/Productivity_Performance/Whats_driving_Africas_growth_2601) and, not surprisingly, foreign direct investment (FDI) has boomed over the past few years. According to UNCTAD's [World Investment Report](http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1465), FDI increased from about $9 billion in 2000 to $18 billion in 2004 and $88 billion by 2008. Nearly twice the value of official development aid, FDI can drive growth and encourage technological and human capital spillovers. Excluding South Africa, financial markets in the sub-Saharan region have remained rather thin. However, several African countries have started to show interest in bonds and equities markets. In 2011, Zambia, Angola, Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda are [expected to issue bonds](http://af.reuters.com/article/investingNews/idAFJOE6AL0JH20101122?sp=true). African equities markets are still immature, but there are [promising prospects](http://www.africa-investor.com/article.asp?id=7034) for the coming years, especially if FDI inflows continue to grow at fast speeds. Agriculture provides the other great chance for sustained growth. McKinsey estimated that 60 percent of the world's total uncultivated arable land is located in Africa and the continent is "ripe for a green revolution like the ones that transformed agriculture in Asia and Brazil." With the appropriate techniques, output could triple from $280 billion today to $880 billion in 2030. **Trade** Parallel to the global shift of economic power East, African countries are finding a wealth of opportunities in Asia. The total [trade with China surged to $115 billion in 2010](http://www.businessinsider.com/china-africa-trade-115-billion-2010-12) and [trade relations with India](http://nyuiba.com/ibj/2010/12/india%E2%80%99s-race-to-africa/) are increasing at a fast pace, especially in East and Southern Africa. It is estimated that economic relations with emerging countries now account for approximately one-third of total merchandise trade, and the percentage is increasing especially for oil-exporting countries such as Angola and Nigeria. Trade between developing Asian countries and non-commodity exporters such as Kenya and Uganda is increasing but at a slower rate. Nevertheless, the EU and US remain major trade partners, accounting for more than half of total exports of goods. If we also consider trade in services, tourism and remittances, then the position of western countries is predominant throughout the region. According to the IMF Regional Economic Outlook, "despite the heterogeneity of sub-Saharan Africa, this finding is true even at the level of individual countries," confirming the key importance of bilateral African-EU/US trade relations. **Consumer markets** Africa's future growth will be driven by the expansion of the domestic market linked to demographic trends. Fast rural-urban migration over the past decades and demographic pressures have had enormous consequences in terms of precarious employment, expansion of informal settlements, crime and environmental hazards in African cities. Since 1980, the urban population is estimated to have increased from just 28 percent to over 40 percent in 2008 and the [growth rate in the largest African cities](http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2010/12/urbanisation_africa) between 2010 and 2025 is predicted to be extremely high throughout the continent, especially in Eastern and Central Africa. On the one hand, uncontrolled urbanization has brought governance and infrastructural challenges that most governments have failed to tackle. Despite the support of non-governmental and civil society organizations, most African city dwellers still struggle because of poor planning and the lack of appropriate sanitation, hygiene and sewage services. On the other, economists agree about the large opportunities that may emerge at the aggregate level thanks to urbanization. The shift from rural-based jobs to urban employment will promote a rise in the average income levels over the next two decades, which could turn Africa into a major consumer market. According to McKinsey, in 2008 over 85 million Africans earned over $5,000 - a "threshold" level which gives consumers the possibility to spend over half of their income on non-food products. The consumer market in 2008, estimated at $860 million, is of comparable size to economies such as India and Russia. **Risks** The recent resurgence of optimism for African development will probably benefit growth and attract investors. However, risk analysts are aware of the variety of threats on the horizon in 2011, related to uncertain international economic scenarios and the busy African electoral agenda. Skeptics of African growth are wary of two particular factors: first, the fundamental uncertainties still underlying the global economy, in particular the sovereign debt crises in Europe, which may cut imports from Africa. Forecasts predict recovery in the US and moderate growth in the EU; however, the situation could collapse in case of sovereign defaults in Portugal, Spain or even Italy. Even though African economies are increasingly attached to the business cycles of emerging markets, in the short-term they continue to be strongly linked to European economies, and therefore their fate also depends on the European Central Bank's (ECB) strategies to tackle the debt crisis. Second, skeptics argue that current growth levels in Africa are not sustainable because they depend excessively on high commodity prices. Prices for key export markets such as oil and mineral resources have surged since 2000 and last month's [food prices reached a 20 year high](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/51241bc0-18b4-11e0-b7ee-00144feab49a.html#axzz1AMMq1VCq), with a positive impact on GDP growth but dangerous consequences for the purchasing power of low-income populations. However, according to McKinsey, commodities contributed only 24 percent of GDP growth since 2000, whereas 76 percent was created in other sectors, especially retail, agriculture, manufacturing and telecommunication. This demonstrates an unprecedented level of economic diversification on the continent. Arguably, in 2011 the greatest political risk is related to the [busy election agenda](http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/calendar2011.htm). In addition to the recent vote for independence in South Sudan, this year will see 17 presidential elections on the continent, including the delicate cases of Nigeria, the DRC and Uganda. Election years are risky because they can provoke financial mismanagement on the part of governments, as many political parties fund costly campaigns at the [expense of macroeconomic solidity](http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE7060JC20110107) in their countries. They can also exacerbate social tensions, as recently as last month on the Ivory Coast and in Kenya in 2008. The socioeconomic, let alone political, consequences of such tensions and related violence are enormous. The challenge for African governments in sustaining development and continuing to attract investors is to build political institutions capable of maintaining peace and representing the complex social structures of their societies. In the short term, the international community must try to actively contribute to the easing of electoral tensions and the promotion of smooth voting processes.

## Predictions Good

### Scenario Planning Good

#### Predictions are necessary – even if they could be wrong, scenario planning helps reduce uncertainty and the alternative is policy paralysis

Whitt 2009

[Richard, Washington Telecom and Media Counsel at Google, “Adaptive Policymaking: Evolving and Applying Emergent Solutions for U.S. Communications Policy”, Federal Communications Law Journal, vol. 61, issue 3, Questia]

Emergence Economics tells us that **prognostication and planning are difficult, if not impossible, to get right. The inevitable personal limitations of information, perception, and cognition, coupled with a dynamic and unpredictable environment, makes failure far more common than success.** Attempting long-range planning can also clash with the adaptive principle of making contextual, evidence-based decisions. **Still, appreciating this reality should not lead to decisional paralysis**. **Those making public policy must do what they can to peer into the fog and discern some patterns that can help shape analysis.** There are a number of possible ways to project into the present and future, using a mix of reason and imagination, to solve problems. I will briefly touch on three that are based more on policy option scenarios rather than outfight predictions. Peter **Schwartz has devised what he calls "the art of the long view," which is** **premised on developing and using scenarios to help cabin uncertainty and improve decision making**. (332) **This** multi-stage **process involves** (1) **identifying a focal decision**, (2) listing the key factors influencing the success or failure of that decision, (3) listing the driving forces (social, economic, political, environmental, and technological) that influence the key factors, (4) ranking the key factors and driving forces based on relative importance and degree of uncertainty, (5) **selecting the potential scenarios along a matrix**, (6) **fleshing out the scenarios**, (7) **assessing the implications**, and (8) selecting leading indicators and signposts. (333) **An important takeaway here is that the use of scenarios can help identify the various environmental forces that can affect implementation of a policy decision, reducing to some degree the uncertainty that otherwise surrounds that process**. Closer to the near-term, Richard **Ogle talks about utilizing** "the idea-spaces of the extended mind," which he identifies as including **qualities like imagination, intuition, and insight**. (334) As Ogle sees it, reason proceeds cautiously and looks backward, while the imagination and its allied capacities look more boldly forward. (335) More specifically, the Cartesian model of thinking is based on continuity, because logical and probabilistic reasoning cannot abide gaps. (336) By contrast, **creative breakthroughs typically involve leaps into the unknown. (337) Because the imagination is the mind's supreme faculty for dealing with the future, and it reaches places where reason cannot go, Ogle suggests ways to harness the imagination to improve one's decision-making abilities.** (338) As Ogle quotes Einstein, "Logic will get you from A to B, imagination will take you everywhere." (339) Finally, Thomas **Homer-Dixon argues for the necessity to develop a "prospective mind ... comfortable with constant change, radical surprise, and even breakdown**." (340) **He sees each of these as inevitable features of our world**, requiring us constantly to anticipate a wide variety of futures. "**We need to exercise our imaginations so that we can challenge the unchallengeable and conceive the inconceivable**." (341) **He also argues**: **"Precise prediction is impossible because our complex and nonlinear world is full of unknown unknowns-**-things we do not know that we do not know." (342) **But a mind open to numerous possibilities is better equipped to anticipate and deal with change than a mind closed off to such possibilities**.

### Economic Predictions Good

#### Models are critical to good economic theory – net benefit is education

Krul 2010

[PhD at Brunel University, Masters in Economic History from the London School of Economics, “How to Criticize and How Not to Criticize Positive Neoclassical Economics I: Models”, http://mccaine.org/2010/11/06/how-to-criticize-and-how-not-to-criticize-positive-neoclassical-economics-i-models/]

This does, however, raise some real questions which can be fruitfully used as points of criticism. The main point is the necessity of understanding the nature of the predictive value that these models are supposed to have and that they are supposed to be judged by. As is well-known by now in philosophy of science, the actual factual outcomes which would constitute the empirical test for theories are underdetermined by theory: for any given factual case there is always more than one theory that can account for it. In practice it is therefore not easily possible to apply a simple methodology that ignores whatever the assumptions may be and builds a predictive model, and then compares it with rival predictive models for the purposes of empirical testing. There will never be agreement about to what extent reality matches with given such theories, as is shown by the long-term persistence of strong theoretical divisions, whether between Marxists and neoclassical economists or more narrowly between Keyenesians and monetarists. It is almost impossible to determine a priori therefore at what level one should declare the problem to occur if the facts do not match the predictions of a model: maybe the data are wrongly gathered, or maybe the data are polluted by third variables affecting them, or maybe the model was wrongly constructed, or maybe the theory is incorrect. Which of these one thinks the most likely one in any given case tends to depend strongly in practice on the political and theoretical implications it would have and the degree to which they fit one’s preconceived idea of how the world works. As Friedman states: “Observed facts are necessarily finite in number; possible hypotheses infinite. If there is one hypothesis that is consistent with the available evidence, there are always an infinite number that are.”(4) Understanding this fact also allows us to understand the different uses to which modelling in neoclassical economics can be put (and not only in neoclassical economics). Because one cannot go directly from a model to reality to check whether the predictions hold true, the models function, as Uskali Mäki and others have pointed out, as a model world. They are worlds in which the assumptions made hold true – worlds in which perfect information exists, profit is maximized, or whatever. This allows them to be judged on their theoretical virtues as a way of distinguishing one hypothesis about the known facts from another, in light of the above mentioned underdetermination.(5) These theoretical virtues, again, would be primarily those of parsimony and of elegance of explanation, as well as the manner in which it allows hitherto complicated matters to be formalized for ease of use. In such a way, this formalization can allow us to grapple better with complicated questions by distilling them into clearly defined elements when they would otherwise remain muddled. As Levins and Lewontin defend mathematical formalization in science: Mathematics is used mostly in modeling in order to predict the outcomes of systems of equations. But is also has another use: educating the intuition so that the obscure becomes obvious. When we abstract from the reality of interest to create mathematical objects, we do this because some questions that would seem intractable can now be grasped immediately.

#### Reject their sweeping indicts of models – prefer the specificity and diversity of applied economic methods

Krul 2010

[PhD at Brunel University, Masters in Economic History from the London School of Economics, “How to Criticize and How Not to Criticize Positive Neoclassical Economics I: Models”, http://mccaine.org/2010/11/06/how-to-criticize-and-how-not-to-criticize-positive-neoclassical-economics-i-models/]

The role of assumptions in models can therefore be manifold, as manifold as the purpose of the models themselves. Models in economics will then namely be seen as having two major possible functions (there are also some minor ones which I will not go into in detail): either they function as purely theoretical model worlds, and the purpose of the exercise is to elucidate some aspect hitherto unacknowledged about this model world, thereby improving the precision of and knowledge about a given positive economic theory, or a model attempts to directly make a claim about real causes that operate in reality, by either making a predictive claim on the basis of the model’s abstraction of reality or by making a claim about the reality of the causal factor identified in the model. These two different approaches are both common in neoclassical economics and are not always properly differentiated by the economists themselves. Yet they should attract accordingly different criticisms on their merits. Uskali Mäki again has described very well what the difference is between the ‘substitute systems’, as he calls the former type, and the ‘surrogate systems’, as he calls the latter type: One kind of criticism attacks styles of inquiry that treat a model as a substitute system only, not even intending it as a means for gaining access to the real world. The alleged problem is that there is no attempt. The other kind of criticism acknowledges a model being treated as a surrogate system, but blames it for failing in accessing the social world. The alleged problem is that there is a failed attempt. The history of economics exhibits both kinds of criticism. (7) In order to criticize neoclassical economics effectively, one must separate these two types of criticism. The unrealisticness of assumptions is warranted insofar as a given model’s identification of causes can, in the terminology of Mäki, be said still to resemble the real causes operating in the world; it is an empirical question whether this is the case or not, and therefore one that is very liable to the underdetermination problem identified above. However, there are also cases in which the unrealisticness is always unwarranted. There are several such cases. The most important one is the case in which either the model is only used to elucidate other models or assumptions in positive neoclassical economics, without making the attempt to connect it with the real world in any way, except highly indirectly – on the basis of the principle that most of neoclassical economics can be accepted as known and true, and therefore elucidating theoretical aspects of neoclassical economics’ assumptions is helpful. Here the model is then subject to the ‘so what?’ critique: even if it is true that a given model has certain properties as a thought experiment, it is still necessary to justify empirically the connection of the thought experiment to reality. However, there is obviously room for maneouvre here: as Mäki also points out, what appears from a critic’s point of view as a substitute system can from the point of view of a practitioner appear as a surrogate system, it just happens that the model discussed in a given paper is only remotely connected with the eventual application to reality. Again, there will be disagreement on the point of this being true or not, and the more remote the application to reality is, the greater the room for challenge. Very often in economic papers the models discussed make no hypothesis about reality at all, or when they do, the hypothesis makes an immediate and unjustified leap from the theoretical properties of the model to the theoretical properties of reality – here is an excellent terrain for criticizing neoclassical economics, which seems especially prone to these errors. A slightly less significant but also relevant point of criticism for modelling in this context is the use of assumptions in models for the purposes of tractability, including presentation for pedagogical purposes and the like. Here, it is of the utmost importance that such assumptions when unrealistic are as trivial and as irrelevant to the actual point of contention as possible. As Mäki has pointed out but perhaps not emphasized strongly enough, contrary to the habitual practice of many neoclassical economists, any unrealistic assumptions made for the purposes of tractability must not have any ontological implications. As his example goes: A few decades ago economists lacked the mathematical tools for dealing with increasing returns and monopolistic competition in a general equilibrium framework. This violated the ontological convictions of many economists working on development issues: these economists conceived of (major parts of) the economy as being governed by positive feedback mechanisms and market imperfections. In case a conflict between ontology and tractability is resolved in favor of tractability while suppressing ontology, the obvious suspicion is that the models that ensue are (or are to be) treated as substitute systems only.

### Rejection Bad

#### Turn—rejecting strategic predictions of threats makes them inevitable—decision-makers will rely on preconceived conceptions of threat rather than the more qualified predictions of analysts

Fitzsimmons 2007

[Michael, Washington DC defense analyst, “The Problem of Uncertainty in Strategic Planning”, Survival, Winter 06-07, online]

But handling even this weaker form of uncertainty is still quite challenging. **If not sufficiently bounded, a high degree of variability in planning factors can exact a significant price on planning. The complexity presented by great variability strains the cognitive abilities of even the most sophisticated decision- makers.**15 And even a robust decision-making process sensitive to cognitive limitations necessarily sacrifices depth of analysis for breadth as variability and complexity grows. It should follow, then, that **in planning under conditions of risk, variability in strategic calculation should be carefully tailored to available analytic and decision processes**. Why is this important? What harm can an imbalance between complexity and cognitive or analytic capacity in strategic planning bring? Stated simply, **where analysis is silent or inadequate**, **the personal beliefs of decision-makers** **fill the void**. As political scientist Richard Betts found in a study of strategic sur- prise, **in ‘an environment that lacks clarity, abounds with conflicting data, and allows no time for rigorous assessment of sources and validity, ambiguity allows intuition or wishfulness to drive interpretation ... The greater the ambiguity, the greater the impact of preconception**s.’16 The decision-making environment that Betts describes here is one of political-military crisis, not long-term strategic planning. But **a strategist who sees uncertainty as the central fact** of his environ- ment **brings upon** himself **some of the pathologies of crisis decision-making.** He **invites ambiguity, takes conflicting data for granted and substitutes a priori scepticism about the validity of prediction** for time pressure **as a rationale for discounting the importance of analytic rigour**. It is important not to exaggerate the extent to which data and ‘rigorous assessment’ can illuminate strategic choices. Ambiguity is a fact of life, and scepticism of analysis is necessary. Accordingly, the intuition and judgement of decision-makers will always be vital to strategy, and attempting to subordinate those factors to some formulaic, deterministic decision-making model would be both undesirable and unrealistic. All the same, there is danger in the opposite extreme as well**. Without careful analysis of what is relatively likely and what is relatively unlikely, what will be the possible bases for strategic choices? A decision-maker with no faith in prediction is left with little more than** a set of worst-case scenarios and his **existing beliefs about the world** to confront the choices before him. **Those beliefs may be more or less well founded, but if they are not made explicit and subject to analysis and debate regarding their application to particular strategic contexts, they remain only beliefs and premises, rather than rational judgements. Even at their best, such decisions are likely to be poorly understood by the organisations charged with their implementation**. At their worst, such decisions may be poorly understood by the decision-makers themselves.

### A2 Menand

#### This evidence doesn’t apply—it doesn’t indict all predictions, just those that are made by pundits without evidence

Menand 2005

(Louis, The New Yorker, 10/5, lexis)

It was no news to Tetlock, therefore, that experts got beaten by formulas. But he does believe that he discovered something about **why some people make better forecasters than other people.** It has to do not with what the experts believe but with the way they think. Tetlock uses Isaiah Berlin's metaphor from Archilochus, from his essay on Tolstoy, "The Hedgehog and the Fox," to illustrate the difference. He says**: Low scorers look like hedgehogs: thinkers who "know one big thing,"** aggressively extend the explanatory reach of that one big thing into new domains, display bristly impatience with those who "do not get it," and express considerable confidence that they are already pretty proficient forecasters, at least in the long term. **High scorers look like foxes: thinkers who know many small things** (tricks of their trade), are skeptical of grand schemes, see explanation and prediction not as deductive exercises but rather as exercises in flexible "ad hocery" that require stitching together diverse sources of information, and are rather diffident about their own forecasting prowess. A hedgehog is a person who sees international affairs to be ultimately determined by a single bottom-line force: balance-of-power considerations, or the clash of civilizations, or globalization and the spread of free markets. A hedgehog is the kind of person who holds a great-man theory of history, according to which the Cold War does not end if there is no Ronald Reagan. Or he or she might adhere to the "actor-dispensability thesis," according to which Soviet Communism was doomed no matter what. Whatever it is, the big idea, and that idea alone, dictates the probable outcome of events. For the hedgehog, therefore, predictions that fail are only "off on timing," or are "almost right," derailed by an unforeseeable accident. There are always little swerves in the short run, but the long run irons them out. Foxes, on the other hand, don't see a single determining explanation in history. They tend, Tetlock says, "to see the world as a shifting mixture of self-fulfilling and self-negating prophecies: self-fulfilling ones in which success breeds success, and failure, failure but only up to a point, and then self-negating prophecies kick in as people recognize that things have gone too far." Tetlock did not find, in his sample, any significant correlation between how experts think and what their politics are. His hedgehogs were liberal as well as conservative, and the same with his foxes. (Hedgehogs were, of course, more likely to be extreme politically, whether rightist or leftist.) He also did not find that his foxes scored higher because they were more cautious-that their appreciation of complexity made them less likely to offer firm predictions. Unlike hedgehogs, who actually performed worse in areas in which they specialized, **foxes enjoyed a modest benefit from expertise**. Hedgehogs routinely over-predicted: twenty per cent of the outcomes that hedgehogs claimed were impossible or nearly impossible came to pass, versus ten per cent for the foxes. More than thirty per cent of the outcomes that hedgehogs thought were sure or near-sure did not, against twenty per cent for foxes. The upside of being a hedgehog, though, is that when you're right you can be really and spectacularly right. Great scientists, for example, are often hedgehogs. They value parsimony, the simpler solution over the more complex. In world affairs, parsimony may be a liability-but, even there, there can be traps in the kind of highly integrative thinking that is characteristic of foxes. Elsewhere, Tetlock has published an analysis of the political reasoning of Winston Churchill. Churchill was not a man who let contradictory information interfere with his idees fixes. This led him to make the wrong prediction about Indian independence, which he opposed. But it led him to be right about Hitler. He was never distracted by the contingencies that might combine to make the elimination of Hitler unnecessary. **Tetlock** also **has an** unscientific **point to make, which is that "we as a society would be better off if participants in policy debates stated their beliefs in testable forms"-that is, as probabilities-"monitored their forecasting performance,** and honored their reputational bets." He thinks that we're suffering from our primitive attraction to deterministic, overconfident hedgehogs. It's true that the only thing the electronic media like better than a hedgehog is two hedgehogs who don't agree. **Tetlock notes**, sadly, a point that Richard Posner has made about these kinds **of public intellectuals,** which is that most of them **are dealing in "solidarity" goods, not "credence" goods. Their analyses and predictions are tailored to make their ideological brethren feel good**-more white swans for the white-swan camp. A prediction, in this context, is just an exclamation point added to an analysis. Liberals want to hear that whatever conservatives are up to is bound to go badly; when the argument gets more nuanced, they change the channel. On radio and television and the editorial page, the line between expertise and advocacy is very blurry, and pundits behave exactly the way Tetlock says they will. Bush Administration loyalists say that their predictions about postwar Iraq were correct, just a little off on timing; pro-invasion liberals who are now trying to dissociate themselves from an adventure gone bad insist that though they may have sounded a false alarm, they erred "in the right direction"-not really a mistake at all.

### A2 Expertism Bad

#### Rejecting expertism means you vote for Palin- this allows conservative, reactionary, uneducated masses to takeover democracy and swamp reason

Lilla 2008

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The die was cast. Over the next 25 years **there grew up a new generation of conservative writers who cultivated none of their elders' intellectual virtues -- indeed, who saw themselves as** **counter-intellectuals.** Most are well-educated and many have attended Ivy League universities; in fact, **one of the masterminds of the Palin nomination was once a Harvard professor.** But **their function** within the conservative movement **is no longer to educate** and ennoble a populist political tendency, **it is to defend that tendency against the supposedly monolithic and uniformly** **hostile educated classes**. **They mock the advice of Nobel Prize-winning economists and praise the financial acumen of plumbers** and builders. **They ridicule ambassadors and diplomats while promoting jingoistic journalists who have never lived abroad and speak no foreign languages**. And with the rise of shock radio and television, **they have found a large, popular audience that eagerly absorbs their** **contempt for intellectual elites.** **They hoped to shape that audience, but the truth is that their audience has now shaped them**. Back in the '70s**, conservative intellectuals loved to talk about "radical chic," the well-known tendency of educated,** often **wealthy liberals to project their political fantasies onto brutal revolutionaries and street thugs, and romanticize their "struggles."** But "**populist chic" is just the inversion of "radical chic," and is no less absurd, comical or ominous**. **Traditional conservatives were always suspicious of populism, and they were right to be. They saw elites as a fact of political life, even of democratic life. What matters in democracy is that those elites acquire their positions through** **talent and experience, and that they be educated to serve the public good**. But **it also matters that they own up to their elite status and defend the need for elites. They must be friends of democracy while protecting it, and themselves, from the leveling and vulgarization all democracy tends toward**. Writing recently in the New York Times, David Brooks noted correctly (if belatedly) that **conservatives' "disdain for liberal intellectuals" had slipped into "disdain for the educated class as a whole,"** and worried that the Republican Party was alienating educated voters. **I couldn't care less about the future of the Republican Party, but I do care about the** **quality of political thinking and judgment in the country as a whole**. There was a time when conservative intellectuals raised the level of American public debate and helped to keep it sober. Those days are gone. As for political judgment, the promotion of Sarah Palin as a possible world leader speaks for itself. The Republican Party and the political right will survive, but the conservative intellectual tradition is already dead. And all of us, even liberals like myself, are poorer for it.